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Researchers have had a long-standing interest in the relative contributions of 
implicit and explicit processes to judgments and behaviours.  Although conscious 
deliberation has often served as the “gold standard” for normatively correct decisions, 
researchers are increasingly beginning to focus their attention on the relative strengths 
of implicit processes, pointing to situations in which, it is claimed, they can sometimes 
exceed rational deliberation.  In this work, I explore both the descriptive question of 
how individuals come to trust the dictates of an implicit or explicit process when the two 
pull in opposing directions, as well as the prescriptive question of when implicit and 
explicit processes can serve as reliable guides for sound judgments and adaptive 
behaviours. 
Three lines of work examine these questions.  In the first line (Studies 1-3), I ask 
how people come to trust intuition or reason in the context of situations in which they 
experience a conflict between them.  I find consistent support for what I call the state 
cuing hypothesis—that is, the notion that people attempt to resolve such conflicts by 
looking for cues in their current mental states that help them decide what to do.  
Specifically, I find that when the features of one’s mental state matches the features 
people associate with intuitive or rational thought, this serves to make one source of 
input “feel right,” causing it to exert a greater influence on the decision. 
 
 
In the second line of work (Studies 4-8), I assess the extent to which intuitions  
can successfully capture relevant aspects of one’s prior experiences with decision 
objects, thus allowing them to serve as a reliable source of information when choosing 
among them.  However, across 4 replication attempts, I find that intuitive judgments are 
perhaps not as reliable as past research would suggest.   
Finally, in the third line of work (Studies 8-12), I assess whether implicit attitudes 
can be quickly revised in light of recent, relevant experiences.  I find consistent support 
across the studies that implicit attitudes can indeed be rapidly revised in light of new, 
countervailing information, thus suggesting that implicit attitudes can serve as a reliable 
guide for behaviour even in situations in which recent experience is inconsistent with 
past learning.   
Taken together, this research attempts to advance our understanding both of 
the factors that can influence the extent to which people believe that implicit and 
explicit processes are valuable and reliable, as well as the actual contribution of each 
type of process to normative and satisfying judgments and behaviours. 
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CHAPTER I. Introduction 
I.  
By any reasonable measure, Timothy Cook had, by the beginning of 1998, 
already achieved an impressive amount of success.  Cook was the Vice President 
for Corporate Materials at Compaq—a company that, in the booming IT industry 
of the 1990s, had become an exceptionally profitable manufacturer of desktop 
computers.  Its flagship product, the Compaq Presario, was a household name—
one of the first personal computers available for less than a thousand dollars, 
making it a more affordable alternative to higher-end products of that era. 
Early that year, an executive head-hunter approached Cook with an 
opportunity.  At the time, Apple—one of Compaq’s main rivals in the industry—
was in the midst of a dramatic re-shuffling of its corporate leadership.  Just six 
months earlier, the company had ousted its CEO, Gil Amelio, and replaced him, in 
a strange turn of events, with one of the men that had founded the company in 
the 1970s but that had, just over a decade earlier, also found himself ousted by 
the board of directors—Steve Jobs.  Back at the helm of the company he created, 
Jobs was looking to reinvent the Apple brand.  He had a strong vision about how 
to put the technology company back on top again.  And he wanted Cook to be 
one of the people to help him do it. 
Faced with a choice between staying in his current position at Compaq 
and following Steve Jobs in his vision of reinventing the company he founded, 
Cook, being an engineer by training, knew the “right” way to make the decision.  
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When he enumerated all of the costs and benefits of each potential course of 
action, the decision could not have been more obvious.  The Apple of today is 
such a powerhouse of the IT world—with dizzying numbers of fans lining up for 
hours to buy their latest products on the day of their release—that we largely 
forget that the Apple of the 1990s was, by all accounts, a company in complete 
disarray.  In 1998, while Cook was attempting to make his decision, the handheld 
devices that have come to be most strongly associated with the Apple brand—
the iPod, iPhone, iPad, even the iMac—were still vague ideas on whiteboards.  It 
was, according to Time Magazine, “one of the worst managed companies in the 
industry.”   The company had suffered a number of high-profile financial losses 
and product flops.  Its stocks had sat at record lows for the previous three years.  
It was quickly becoming a pariah of the industry, widely considered to be a failing 
brand just barely on life support.  When Michael Dell, the founder of another 
well-known technology giant of that era, was asked at ITxpo ‘97 for his thoughts 
about what could be done to make Apple profitable again, he famously said, “I’d 
shut it down and give the money back to the shareholders.” 
By contrast, the Compaq of 1998 could not have been more vibrant or its 
future seemingly brighter.  By the time that Cook had been approached by Jobs, 
his current employer had exceeded even IBM as the largest manufacturer of 
personal computers in the world.  The company had been turning record profits 
in quarter after quarter for the previous several years.  Forbes had just crowned 
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it with the designation of Company of the Year.  Others had called it the “king of 
the business world.” 
But something about changing companies just felt right.  For reasons that 
escape him to this day, five minutes into his meeting with Steve Jobs, Timothy 
knew that he wanted to work at Apple.  Though his friends and colleagues told 
him that he would be a fool to take the job, his intuition told him that Steve Jobs 
was right and that his friends and colleagues—not to mention the actuarial 
tables, and the market analysts, and the costs and benefits analyses, and Michael 
Dell—were wrong.  That was how, in March of 1998, Cook became the Senior 
Vice President of Worldwide Operations at Apple, working alongside Steve Jobs 
in one of the most dramatic corporate turnarounds in recent memory.   
Today, Cook has, in the wake of Steve Jobs’ passing, stepped into the role 
of CEO of the world’s most recognizable tech brand, and, with his acquisition of 
one million of Apple’s stock units as part of the compensation package he 
received at the beginning of this year (valued at over $400 million), he is now the 
world’s highest-paid CEO.   
Compaq, however, has fared considerably less well.  Just two years after 
Cook’s departure, as a result of a high-profile merger with Digital Equipment 
Corporation that turned sour and the realities of a market that was steadily 
becoming less interested in personal computers in favour of the handheld 
devices that Apple would come to represent, the company began to falter.  Not 
long after being named Company of the Year, Compaq was, rather suddenly and 
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rather jarringly, being described by market observers as “a shaken company with 
an uncertain future.”  In the final two-and-a-half years of the 1990s—while the ‘i’ 
prefix that has come to symbolize Apple’s innovative product line was achieving 
its first market presence with the release of the iMac in 1998—Compaq lost 
more money than it had in the previous sixteen years combined. 
Twelve years later, describing a decision that, with the benefit of 
hindsight, we can now recognize as the single best decision of his career despite 
every rational consideration that would have been available to him at the time, 
Cook said, “there are times in our lives when the careful consideration of costs 
and benefits just doesn't seem like the right way to make a decision.  There are 
times in all of our lives when a reliance on gut or intuition just seems more 
appropriate—when a particular course of action just feels right.” 
II.  
 
Stories of the remarkably insightful intuitions of highly successful people 
possess a quality of mystery and intrigue.  We delight in learning of CEOs that 
somehow “knew” what others did not—situations in which a lone individual goes 
against the advice of everyone around her and every rational consideration 
available to her but is nonetheless later vindicated for “trusting her gut” when 
she somehow knew it was right.  Many read such stories in the hopes that they 
too can somehow, in Gladwell’s (2005) terms, “think without thinking” and arrive 
at stunningly successful choices and decisions.  In this way, intuitive judgment 
possesses many of the qualities that Chabris and Simons (2010) have called “the 
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illusion of potential”—the cognitive illusion that we can rather effortlessly 
acquire new skills or abilities.  If only we could learn to harness the power of our 
intuitions and better learn to “listen to our hearts,” we too could know that 
leaving the “king of the business world” for “one of the worst managed 
companies in the industry” would be one of the best decisions of our careers.  
Indeed, if the recent success of a number of popular treatments of intuition is 
any indication (Gladwell, 2005; Gigerenzer, 2007; Myers, 2002), people seem 
quite willing to accept the idea that intuitions can be a successful, stunningly 
prescient source of information that can aid decision-making if people are willing 
to place their trust in them. 
Outside of popular culture, however, scholars have been relatively more 
reluctant to grant any kind of power or mysterious, ineffable insight to intuitive 
judgment or other types of non-conscious processes.  Sound rational analyses 
have long been considered the gold standard of high-quality decision-making, 
and it is generally thought that individuals ignore such rational considerations at 
their peril.  At the same time, passion and emotion have, at least in scholarly 
circles, long been considered a source of bias and error that must be silenced in 
favour of dispassionate logical analyses.  Psychologists have been strongly 
influenced by such thinking.  Indeed, in summarizing researchers’ views of 
intuitive judgment across many decades of research, Hogarth (2010) has 
observed that it “has not been held in high esteem by researchers in most of the 
last 60 years” (p. 339). 
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The reasons for researchers’ relative skepticism about the quality of 
intuitive judgment are not especially hard to discern.  Early examinations of 
individuals’ judgments had demonstrated that even a simple actuarial formula 
that took account of only a small subset of potential factors that could influence 
a decision could invariably outperform participants’ idiosyncratic clinical 
predictions (Meehl, 1954; Dawes, Faust & Meehl, 1989).  Moreover, even when a 
statistical formula resulted in systematic prediction errors, participants’ clinical 
judgments were nonetheless inevitably found to be even more error-prone.  
Indeed, in decades of research, no situation had been uncovered in which 
participants’ unaided judgments consistently exceeded the performance of a 
relevant rational analysis (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989).  These early 
demonstrations had thus strongly implied that rational deliberation was an 
invariably better alternative to whatever other idiosyncratic knowledge 
participants may have brought to a decision, and that individuals’ snap 
judgments might best be ignored. 
Another reason for researchers’ skepticism of the power of intuitive 
judgment comes from the highly influential heuristics and biases program of 
research on judgment under uncertainty pioneered by Kahneman and Tversky in 
the 1970s (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; see also Kahneman, 2011).  The success 
of this program of research in identifying a host of situations in which individuals 
had especially compelling intuitions that were normatively inferior to a reasoned 
analysis serves as a strong testament to the value of clear, rational thought.  For 
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example, in one of Tversky & Kahneman’s (1983) most famous demonstrations, 
participants were asked to consider the following problem: 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy.  As a 
student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and 
also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. 
Which is more probable? 
1. Linda is a bank teller. 
2. Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. 
Participants’ intuitions strongly compel them to believe that the second 
option is more probable (85%) even though this is a logically impossible outcome 
by virtue of it being a subset of the first. 
 Kahneman and Tversky (1982) were careful to point out that their focus 
on the biases and errors inherent in people’s intuitive judgments under 
uncertainty was ultimately in the service of understanding the mechanisms by 
which such judgments operate.  In the same way that visual illusions can tell us 
something important about the operation of an otherwise exceedingly adaptive 
and well-functioning visual system, they said, so too can the times when 
intuitions lead to compelling yet normatively unsound conclusions tell us 
something important about the nature of people’s judgments and decision-
making.  Indeed, they acknowledged that this exclusive focus on the situations in 
which intuitions falter could give a false impression about the relative quality of 
such judgments, suggesting that heuristics serve as reliable guides of behaviour 
much of the time but could nonetheless lead to error under the well-defined 
circumstances captured in their various experimental dilemmas.  However, the 
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large accumulation of results of the sort described above has, despite Kahneman 
and Tversky’s caution, nonetheless had an important influence on researchers’ 
suspicions about the quality of intuitive insight (but see Gigerenzer et al., 1999). 
 Many lines of seminal research in judgment and decision-making and a 
long tradition in Western thought have thus cast intuition in a relatively poor 
light.  Interestingly, however, a number of researchers in recent years have 
sought to shift the field’s attention away from the shortcomings of intuitions and 
toward the relative utility of non-conscious processes.  This has resulted in the 
identification of a number of situations in which people’s gut feelings seem to 
give rise to adaptive decisions and has brought to light a wide range of stunningly 
complex and adaptive judgments that appear to be the product of trusting the 
“gut” and “listening to the heart.” Indeed, investigators have now begun 
cataloging a number of instances in which intuitions appear to lead individuals 
not only to normatively correct or subjectively satisfying decisions, but even, it is 
claimed, to better outcomes than those obtained by individuals relying on more 
deliberative judgment (Betsch, Plessner, Schweiren, & Gutig, 2001; Dijksterhuis, 
2004; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 
2006; Klein, 1999; Wilson & Schooler, 1991).  Outside of the judgment literature, 
non-conscious processes have similarly been implicated in a number of highly 
complex and adaptive behaviours (see, e.g., Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Chartrand 
& Bargh, 2002; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2004; Hassin, Bargh, & Zimmerman, 2009). 
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 In this way, researchers’ recent attention has begun to shift from the 
shortcomings of implicit processes to the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
each type of process.  However, this research is still very much in its nascent 
stages and we still know relatively little about when and why intuitive judgments 
(or the behaviours that are the product of other non-conscious processes) can 
serve as a basis for sound decisions.  In this dissertation, my goal is thus to 
advance our understanding of how implicit and explicit processes interact to 
influence judgment and behaviour, as well as to better our understanding of the 
normative question of when implicit processes are valid and reliable and when 
they are more likely to be a source of bias and error that should be discounted in 
favour of explicit processes. 
 My discussion will proceed in two parts.  In the first part, I will explore the 
descriptive question of how people come to choose a decision strategy—that is, 
whether they ultimately choose to rely on one process or the other when making 
a decision, particularly in situations in which the two processes pull in two 
different directions.  In the second part, I will explore the prescriptive question of 
when and why implicit or explicit processes may be more reliable and adaptive in 
a given situation.  This is naturally a very large and complex question and there 
will be a large host of factors that will ultimately come to influence whether the 
products of implicit processes are veridical or not.  My discussion of this question 
will thus be somewhat circumscribed, focusing on a few key assumptions about 
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the nature of implicit and explicit processes and exploring the implications of 
these assumptions for the quality of judgment and behaviour. 
VI. Outline of subsequent chapters 
Chapter II 
 In Chapter II, I explore the descriptive question of how people come to 
choose a decision strategy in the context of judgment, exploring, in particular, 
situations in which people face a conflict between the dictates of their gut 
reaction to a decision problem and those of a more rational, deliberative 
analysis.  What is it that leads people to trust their intuitions in some cases—
such as Timothy Cook’s surprising decision to leave the “king of the business 
world” for “one of the worst managed companies in the industry”—and to trust 
reasoned analysis in others? 
 In particular, I empirically test what I call the state cuing hypothesis—that 
is, the prediction that what makes intuition or reason “feel right” in a particular 
situation is the extent to which people can turn to cues in their current mental 
states that closely match the properties of intuitive or rational thought.  When 
people are thinking quickly—a property that closely matches the speed and 
spontaneity of intuitive thought—people are more inclined to trust their 
intuitions; when people experience mental states that encourage more 
deliberative analysis, such as a feeling of meta-cognitive difficulty in processing 
information about a problem, they are more inclined to trust rational analyses. 
11 
 
 In this chapter, I refrain from drawing any conclusions about the relative 
quality of people’s decision-making made on the basis of intuition or reason, and 
instead focus on the predictors of the particular choice strategy that people 
adopt in a given situation.   
Chapter III 
 In the second part of the dissertation (Chapters III and IV), I turn my 
attention to a prescriptive analysis of the circumstances in which implicit and 
explicit processes can serve as the basis for sound decision-making.  In Chapter 
III, I explore this question in the context of intuitive judgment, examining the 
factors that have been posited to influence the quality of intuitive insights. My 
analysis in this chapter hones in on one key assumption that has been made 
about the processes that govern the development of gut feelings—that is, that 
they provide a summary evaluation of the breadth of one’s past experiences with 
a decision object.  Researchers have argued that this ability to capture all of 
one’s prior experience can give intuitions an upper hand in situations in which 
this past experience can usefully be applied to one’s later decisions (e.g., Betsch 
et al., 2001).   
However, even if intuitions can capture such information, an important 
theoretical question with respect to their usefulness in everyday judgment is 
whether the processes that govern the formation of intuitive impulses can 
discount aspects of one’s past experience that are based on fallacious 
information or are irrelevant for later judgments.  That is, their usefulness is 
12 
 
rather limited if they do not possess a necessary validity filter and instead 
promiscuously incorporate all aspects of one’s previous experiences into a 
summary evaluation irrespective of their truth value.  I sought to submit this 
question to empirical test by training participants’ intuitions in a well-known 
experimental paradigm, introducing a source of biased and irrelevant 
information for some participants and not for others.  The main question of 
interest in the studies I report here was thus whether participants’ intuitions 
differed under these different learning conditions or if intuitive judgments 
remained robust to their influence. 
Chapter IV 
 In Chapter IV, I broaden my prescriptive analysis by turning my attention 
to the attitudes literature—another area of research in which the interaction 
between implicit and explicit processes plays a prominent role.  My focus in this 
chapter is on an assumption that has been made about the nature of implicit 
attitudes that has important implications for their reliability—that is, that they 
are relatively slow to develop and relatively heavily-entrenched once 
established.  This assumption implies that implicit attitudes are rather insensitive 
to recent yet highly relevant experiences, making them a source of bias and error 
in situations in which these recent experiences are necessary for adaptive 
behaviour.  Such a situation may arise, for example, when one learns that one’s 
romantic partner of several years has been having an affair with one’s best 
friend.  In this situation, recent experience is both: (a) (presumably) inconsistent 
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with prior experiences, and (b) highly relevant for future behaviour.  Yet, because 
implicit processes are rather insensitive to such information, they may serve as a 
source of maladaptive behaviour towards one’s partner. 
 My focus in chapter IV is on more thoroughly examining the theoretical 
underpinnings of this assumption about the nature of implicit attitudes, 
exploring whether they must necessarily be a source of bias in such situations.  
Based on theoretical conceptions of associative memory, I posit that there are, in 
fact, a number of situations in which implicit attitudes can indeed quickly 
incorporate recently-learned relevant information, and provide empirical 
evidence to support this assertion.  
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART I. Description • Which Process  
Do People Rely On? 
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CHAPTER II. State Cuing: Mental States Cue Choice 
Strategies 
Timothy Cook told the audience at his commencement address at Auburn 
University in 2010 that if he had not cast aside the advice of the people that 
knew him best—if he had trusted his rational analyses of his prospects at 
Apple—he would not have been giving a speech that day and very few people 
would have known who he was.  Moreover, when Cook sided with his intuition 
and with Steve Jobs, he was going against everything that his training as an 
engineer had taught him to do in such situations.  He had done the appropriate 
cost-benefit analysis and yet somehow found it lacking.  What exactly was it that 
made Cook trust his intuitions that day?  How was it that this major career 
decision came to be, in his words, one of the “times in his life when the careful 
consideration of costs and benefits just didn’t seem like the right way to make 
the decision”? 
As Cook’s situation in March of 1998 highlights, such decisions often carry 
a great deal of weight.  There are times, like Cook’s, in which stunningly complex 
and adaptive judgments appear to be the product of trusting the “gut” and 
“listening to the heart”—a point that is substantiated by many instances in the 
judgment literature in which intuitions appear to lead individuals to highly 
adaptive and satisfying choices (Betsch, Plessner, Schweiren, & Gutig, 2001; 
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Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006; Dijksterhuis 
& Nordgren, 2006; Klein, 1999; Wilson & Schooler, 1991).  
But as helpful as intuitions may sometimes be, it is nonetheless easy to 
cite countless instances of times when they have led to faulty judgments, 
erroneous beliefs, and non-optimal choices (Baron, 1988; Gilovich, 1991; 
Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Hall, 1980; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman, 
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). That is, it is easy to cite situations in which intuitions 
should have been discounted in favor of a more deliberative, rational analysis. 
Indeed, even the most ardent supporters of intuitive decision-making are careful 
to point out circumstances in which it is better to ignore or suppress gut feelings 
(e.g, Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006). 
Thus, to effectively navigate a complex world in which gut feelings 
sometimes aid and sometimes hinder judgment and decision making, individuals 
must develop intuitions about their intuitions – that is, beliefs about when their 
gut-feelings can be trusted and relied upon for a sound decision, and when it 
might be best to ignore such feelings and defer to a rational analysis. Should 
people pay attention to a nagging feeling that tells them to dump a particular 
stock, or is it better to focus on a long-term projection indicating that it would be 
better to hold onto it? Should a father trust his instincts about his daughter’s 
new beau, or is that likely to fall into the category of being overprotective? 
Despite a large and growing literature on the relative value of intuitive 
judgment, relatively little is currently known about how people come to trust 
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one source of input into the decision-making process over another.  Are there 
factors that can make intuitive choices seem more compelling?  In Chapter II, my 
goal is to examine this question in more detail, exploring whether there are 
predictable influences that can cause one process to pull harder, ultimately 
encouraging people to trust the dictates of one process over the other. 
II. Dual process models of judgment 
Researchers have generally conceptualized intuition and reason as the 
product of two distinct modes of thought. Although different theorists have put 
forward models that differ somewhat in their concrete details, they generally 
agree on the properties that characterize each mode of thought (Epstein, 1991; 
Evans, 2004; Kahneman, 2003, 2011; Sloman, 1996; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; but 
see Reyna & Brainerd, 2011, for a rather different dual process model). One 
mode—governed by what has been variously labeled the experiential system 
(Epstein, 1991), associative system (Sloman, 1996), or simply System 1 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich & West, 2000)—is 
said to be automatic, fast, associative, affect-laden, non-conscious, and 
effortless. The other—governed by what has been labeled the rational system, 
rule-based system, or System 2—is said to be deliberate, slow, rule-based, 
conscious, and effortful. These different accounts also share the key assumption 
that these two modes of thought can operate in parallel and sometimes produce 
conflicting outputs, giving rise to the quintessential intuition/reason conflict that 
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people sometimes face.  As Sloman (1996, p.19) put it, “The fact that people are 
pulled in two directions at once suggests two forces pulling.” 
Of course, although these models represent the dominant perspective in 
research in judgment (and many other areas of social psychology), they are not 
without controversy (for critiques, see Keren & Schul, 2009; Kruglanski & 
Thompson, 1999; Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996).  Dual process models have been 
strongly challenged on a number of grounds, including the extent to which the 
properties that distinguish the two systems actually represent binary 
dichotomies rather than continuous variables (e.g., “automatic vs. controlled”); 
whether the similarities among the models I highlighted above are more 
apparent than real; and the extent to which the two systems are isolable (for a 
detailed discussion of these issues, see Keren & Schul, 2009; Kruglanski & 
Thompson, 1999; Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996).   
Whether these two modes of thought are best characterized as the 
product of one system, two systems, or more, however, what is relatively less 
controversial is that individuals have very different subjective experiences of the 
two modes of thought.  Suppose, for example, that you learn that it will be 20ºC 
tomorrow.  Will you need a sweater?  For those who have extensive experience 
with the Celsius temperature scale, the answer comes to mind spontaneously 
and with very little thought.  For those who have relatively little experience with 
this scale, however, answering such a question involves relatively more cognitive 
effort, likely requiring the application of a mathematical formula to convert the 
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temperature from the Celsius scale to the Fahrenheit scale (F=9/5×C+32)—a value 
that can then be used to intuit a response.  This subjective difference is the one 
that I will hone in on in this chapter, and I will remain relatively agnostic about 
the origins of these subjective differences. 
III. Going with the head or the gut 
 Like all complex problems, there are likely to be a number of important 
factors that influence which of the two forces ultimately exerts a stronger 
influence on decision-making.  For one thing, it seems odd to choose a romantic 
partner by trying to carefully weigh various “objective” pros and cons or by 
attempting to calculate the precise probability, based on each potential partner’s 
life history, that one will end up blissfully happy, content, disgruntled, or 
divorced. Intuitively, such decisions seem less amenable to a rational analysis 
than, say, choosing a car stereo or deciding which of several models of iPod to 
purchase—decisions in which the attributes of each alternative can be 
delineated and the quality of each alternative precisely evaluated. And even if 
one does engage in this sort of rational analysis to choose the best partner and 
that analysis conflicts with a gut feeling, most people would argue that in a 
decision like this it is better to go with the gut feeling.  But why?  What makes 
choosing a mate an intuitive domain and choosing a stereo a rational domain? 
IV. Task & State Cuing 
In previous work, we (Inbar, Cone & Gilovich, 2010) examined the factors 
that make intuitions seem especially diagnostic in some domains and rational 
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analysis more appropriate in others.  We found that the tendency to favour 
intuition or reason can be predicted from the features of the decision context or 
the object being chosen. More specifically, we found that people appear to be 
cued one way or the other by the extent to which the features of the decision or 
decision context resemble features people associate with intuition or reason. For 
example, rational judgment is thought to be objective (in that it involves the 
application of well-specified rules and criteria) whereas intuition is seen as 
subjective (in that it entails personal, idiosyncratic preferences). When 
evaluating whether one chose well or poorly is similarly subjective (e.g., one’s 
satisfaction with an entrée or a romantic partner) people tend to favour their 
intuitions when making a decision; when the outcome can be objectively 
evaluated (e.g., the success of a military campaign or the return on an 
investment), people tend to favour reason. Similarly, because intuition is 
experienced as a holistic, all-or-none flash of inspiration, whereas reason is a 
slow, step-by-step process, people tend to follow their rational analysis for 
decisions that tend to proceed in a series of sequential stages and their intuition 
for those that happen “all at once.” 
Individuals thus appear to be cued by aspects of the decision context such 
that one mode of thought simply “feels right” and they side with that mode 
when resolving intuition/conflicts—a process that we have called task cuing. In 
the current studies, I explore whether people are similarly cued by aspects of 
their internal state when deciding what to do – a process I call state cuing. I 
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propose that people look for clues for how to resolve intuition-reason conflicts 
wherever they can find them: in much the same way that people look outward to 
features of the decision context to decide which source of input to trust, they 
also look inward to features of their current mental state to discern which course 
of action “feels right.”  For example, because rational analysis is more effortful 
and deliberate than intuitive judgment, the sense of engaging in effortful 
processing should lead individuals to side with their rational analyses. 
Conversely, because intuitive judgment is rapid and efficient whereas rational 
analysis is slow and laborious, the sense that one is thinking at a crisp, rapid pace 
should foster a preference for intuition. 
This proposal fits with a considerable amount of recent work on the 
impact of meta-cognitive assessments on judgment and choice, and with work 
showing that there is considerable “cross talk” between separate mental 
representations and processes, with inputs or computations in one area having 
an impact on assessments and outputs in other, seemingly unrelated areas. An 
incidental physical sensation of weight, for example, can influence the 
significance, or weight, that people attach to stimuli (Jostmann, Lakens, & 
Schubert, 2009); the sensation of physical warmth can make a target person 
seem warmer (Williams & Bargh, 2008) and a friend seem closer to the self 
(Ijzerman & Semin, 2009); and being reminded of an episode of rejection can 
make the ambient temperature seem colder (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006).  
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More generally, a “fit” between one’s current mental state and a to-be-
evaluated stimulus has been shown in numerous circumstances to lead people to 
infer that a choice is right or a proposition is valid (Cesario & Higgins, 2008; 
Higgins, 2005; Higgins & Scholer, 2009; Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Lee & Aaker, 
2004 Risen & Critcher, 2011; Schwarz, Sanna, Skurnik, & Yoon, 2007).  For 
example, Pham & Avnet (2004) found that when people are in promotion-
focused mindsets (that is, those in which they eagerly seek out successes and 
rewards), they are relatively more likely to make their choices based on affective 
responses to alternatives, whereas when they are in a prevention-focused 
mindset (that is, those in which they vigilantly avoid failures and punishment), 
they tend to favour making decisions on the basis of more substantive, reason-
based information.  The researchers argue that participants’ differential 
sensitivity to these two types of information are driven, in part, by the fact that 
prevention-focused mindsets encourage increased vigilance and risk-aversion, 
which ultimately serve to increase reliance on analytical processes—an effect 
that, from the perspective of the state cuing hypothesis, makes rational 
judgments “feel right.”  
In preliminary tests attempting to assess the state cuing hypothesis more 
directly, Inbar (2008) found that when participants are made to feel 
accountable—a mindset in which rational justification of one’s choices is deemed 
important and necessary—participants are cued to trust their rational analyses.  
Similarly, when a hypothetical decision is described with a number of concrete, 
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vivid details—properties that best characterize intuitive thought relative to the 
more abstract nature of deliberative analysis—participants become relatively 
more inclined to side with their gut.   
Although these initial demonstrations are consistent with state cuing, the 
evidence for this hypothesis rests not on any one study, each of which may have 
any number of alternative explanations, but rather on the consistent picture 
painted by a diverse collection of manipulations that employ many different 
types of cues and many different types of decisions in which intuition and reason 
pull in opposing directions.  The current studies thus sought to provide direct 
tests of the state cuing hypothesis, inducing states that matched quintessential 
features of rational and intuitive thought, and assessing participants’ tendencies 
to choose in line with their intuitive assessment or a more deliberative one. 
V. The Current Studies 
The current studies assessed state cuing by employing both hypothetical 
choices and actual decisions with real monetary consequences. In each study, 
participants were first placed into a particular mindset that closely matched one 
of the widely-accepted features associated with intuitive and rational judgment. 
They were then asked to make a decision that I thought would induce an 
intuition/reason conflict and I examined whether they chose to follow their head 
or their gut. In Study 1, I manipulated perceptual fluency to induce a meta-
cognitive sense of ease or difficulty of thought and examined how it influenced 
participants’ responses in the ratio-bias paradigm (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; 
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Epstein, 1991) and in a hypothetical apartment choice. In Study 2, I examined 
whether a meta-cognitive sense of thinking rapidly would make participants 
favour their (rapid) intuitive impulses. Finally, in Study 3, I examined the effect of 
the physical “closeness” of a decision on preferences for intuition over reason. 
Because people feel that that intuitions come from deep within themselves, 
whereas reason is something that exists outside the self (because it relies on 
learned rules and much of it can be done on a blackboard, on a pad of paper, or 
with a calculator), decisions that are presented “in close” to the body might elicit 
more intuitive responses than those that are presented at a distance. 
Study 1: Meta-Cognitive Fluency 
Rational analysis is typically characterized as an effortful, deliberate 
process whereas intuition is seen as spontaneous and effortless. The state cuing 
hypothesis therefore entails that a feeling of engaging in more effortful or 
deliberative processing should serve as a cue to the individual that a rational 
analysis is a good fit to the task at hand, which should lead the individual to 
resolve an intuition-reason conflict in favor of reason. A large literature indicates 
that processing (dis)fluency leads to exactly such a state (Alter & Oppenheimer, 
2009). That is, processing disfluent stimuli leads to a meta-cognitive sense of 
effort and difficulty—a feeling that, according to the state cuing hypothesis, 
should lead people to favor their reasoned analysis. 
Indeed, Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley and Eyre (2007) found that meta-
cognitive disfluency appears to prompt individuals to engage their rational 
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faculties and to be more careful and deliberative in their analysis of a problem or 
decision. In one study, participants completed the Cognitive Reflection Task 
(CRT) – a test which consists of 3 items, each of which has an intuitively 
compelling but incorrect answer that must be overcome with deliberate re-
consideration. When the CRT was presented to participants in a hard-to-read 
font, they were less likely to give the intuitively appealing but incorrect answers. 
In another study, when a persuasive advertisement was difficult to read, 
participants relied more on systematic processing (that is, the central route in 
the Elaboration Likelihood Model—Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty & Wegener, 
1999) than when the advertisement was in an easy-to-read font. 
Oppenheimer and colleagues’ research indicates that the meta-cognitive 
sense of disfluency leads people to engage in more deliberative thought about a 
problem. The state cuing hypothesis takes this a step further: Disfluency should 
not only lead people to engage in more deliberative thought but it should also 
lead them to trust the outputs of their rational analysis more. That is, even when 
the bulk of the processing is done and one is nevertheless torn between an 
intuitive option and a rational option, a meta-cognitive sense of disfluency 
should lead people to find the rational option more appealing. 
To test this idea, I had participants make choices in a version of the ratio-
bias paradigm, a choice dilemma well-known for creating an intuition/reason 
conflict in many participants. Notably, in this paradigm, participants know the 
normatively correct choice—they can readily identify and articulate which option 
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is rationally superior. Nonetheless, they often end up favouring the inferior 
option. Thus, unlike the Cognitive Reflection Task in which greater deliberation 
makes it more likely that participants will arrive at the correct answer, in the 
ratio-bias paradigm participants tend to know the correct answer but 
nonetheless have a hard time selecting it (e.g., Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992, Study 
3). Their choices, then, depend on whether they are inclined to favour one 
input—the rational or the intuitive—over the other. 
Method 
Fifty-three Cornell undergraduates completed an online questionnaire as 
part of their participation in an unrelated experiment. Participants were 
randomly assigned to either a fluent condition, in which the text of the survey 
was presented in a standard, easy-to-read font (Calibri, 11pt; Sample: Calibri), or 
a disfluent condition, in which the text was presented in a difficult-to-read font 
(Haettenschweiler, italicized, 11 pt; sample: Haettenschweiler). Previous research has 
used similar font manipulations to induce a state of perceptual disfluency (see 
Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009).  
Participants first read a version of the ratio-bias paradigm (Epstein, 1991). 
In this paradigm, participants are presented with two urns, each containing two 
different colours of tokens (usually marbles or jellybeans)—a winning colour and 
a losing colour. They are told that a token will be drawn randomly from the urn 
of their choosing and, if a winning token is drawn, they will win a small sum of 
money. One of the urns contains 1 winner and 9 losers. The other urn always 
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contains 100 tokens, but the precise number of winners varies, typically between 
5 and 9. The key feature of the larger urn is that it always contains a higher 
absolute number of winners but a lower percentage. Research using this 
paradigm has established that many participants experience a conflict between 
the rational choice (the small urn with better odds of winning) and the intuitive 
choice (the large urn with a greater number of winners) (Epstein, 1991).   
In my study, participants completed a computerized version of the ratio-
bias paradigm. The text at the top of the screen read: “You are going to draw 
from one of the two urns depicted below. If you draw a red marble, you will win 
$20. Please decide which urn you would like to draw from. Click on your choice.” 
Beneath the description was a two-dimensional graphical depiction of two urns. 
The small urn contained 9 white (losing) marbles and 1 red (winning) marble. The 
large urn contained 91 white (losing) marbles and 9 red (winning) marbles. Below 
each urn, the text indicated the probability (10% and 9%) of drawing a winning 
marble, each displayed in the same fluent or disfluent font as the instructions, 
depending on condition. 
After participants clicked on one of the two urns, they read a hypothetical 
scenario in which they were asked to imagine they were deciding which of two 
apartments to rent: “Imagine that you are choosing an apartment between two 
options. Imagine that rational deliberation has led you to favor Apartment A, but 
you feel a strong intuitive draw toward Apartment B. Which apartment would 
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you choose?” Participants clicked on options labeled either “Apt A” or “Apt B”, 
presented in the same font as the instructions. 
Results 
 To assess the extent to which participants were inclined to follow the 
dictates of a rational analysis or go with a gut feeling, I performed a 2 (fluency: 
fluent or disfluent) × 2 (choice dilemma: apartment or ratio-bias paradigm) 
mixed-model analysis of variance, with fluency as a between-subjects factor and 
choice dilemma as a within-subjects factor.  This analysis yielded the predicted 
significant main effect of condition, F(1, 51)=6.41, p<.02, as well as a significant 
main effect of choice dilemma, F(1,51)=7.50, p<.01 (see Figure 1).  The main 
effect of choice dilemma reflects the fact that participants were more likely to 
choose the intuitive option for the apartment choice (51%) than for the ratio-bias 
paradigm (26%).  The main effect of condition reflects the fact that, as predicted, 
participants in the fluent condition chose more intuitively (50%) than those in 
the disfluent condition (27%).  The interaction was not significant, F(1,51) = 1.02, 
p>.3.  
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Figure 1a. Urn choices in Study 1. 
 
Figure 1b. Apartment Choices in Study 1. 
Figure 1. Participants' responses on the urn and apartment choices in Study 1. 
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Study 2: Speed of Thought 
 The results of Study 1 indicate that an internal state associated with a 
meta-cognitive sense of careful, deliberate processing leads people to favour 
rational analysis when faced with intuition/reason conflicts. According to the 
state cuing hypothesis, any internal state characterized by features strongly 
associated with intuition and reason—not just a sense of effortful processing—
should similarly encourage individuals to trust one source of input over the 
other. For example, another widely-shared belief about intuitive impulses is that 
they arise rapidly and holistically, with little or no awareness of the processes by 
which they were derived (Inbar, Cone, & Gilovich, 2010; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; 
Wilson, 2002). Reasoned assessments, in contrast, are seen as typically 
proceeding slowly and sequentially. Kahneman (2011), for example, summarizes 
this view by characterizing intuitive judgment as “thinking fast” and rational 
analysis as “thinking slow.” 
 According to the state cuing hypothesis, then, when people sense that 
they are thinking relatively rapidly, they should be relatively inclined to trust 
their intuitions; when they have the sense that they are thinking at a more 
measured pace, they should tend to trust their rational analyses. To test this 
idea, I induced participants to experience their thoughts as proceeding either 
quickly or slowly (Pronin & Wegner, 2006). I then presented them with two 
intuition/reason conflicts: (a) a version of the ratio-bias paradigm, and (b) a 
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hypothetical choice between two apartments. I predicted that participants who 
encountered these two choices after having been induced to think at a relatively 
rapid pace would be more inclined to trust their intuitions, whereas participants 
who were thinking at a slower pace would be more inclined to trust their rational 
judgment. 
Method 
 Forty-one Cornell undergraduates participated in exchange for academic 
credit or $5. Participants were seated in front of a computer screen and were 
told by the experimenter (who was unaware of the hypothesis) that they would 
be asked a series of questions, each with two possible answers. They were told 
that each question would appear on the screen and that they should read each 
one aloud before indicating their response verbally to the experimenter. They 
were further told that their answer to one of the questions would have real 
monetary consequences—that they could win $20 at the end of the study 
depending on their choice and the outcome of a drawing.  
Participants then read aloud and answered 12 trivia questions (e.g., 
“Which river is longer: the Hudson or the Potomac?”). These questions were 
presented using PowerPoint software, appearing on the screen in “typewriter” 
fashion (i.e., introduced one character at a time), and advancing at a pace 
designed to induce fast or slow processing (Chandler & Pronin, in press; Pronin, 
Jacobs, & Wegner, 2008; Pronin & Wegner, 2006).  Through pre-testing, I 
determined that it took undergraduates reading at their own pace an average of 
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approximately 8 seconds to read each trivia question.  To induce fast and slow 
thinking, I reduced this speed by 50% in one condition and increased it by 50% in 
the other. Thus, in the fast thought condition (n=20), the slides of the 
PowerPoint presentation automatically advanced every 4 seconds, whereas in 
the slow thought condition (n=21), the slides automatically advanced every 12 
seconds. 
 After answering the 12 trivia questions, participants were then faced with 
the same ratio-bias and hypothetical apartment choices as those used in study 1. 
(The order of these two questions was counterbalanced.) These decisions were 
presented at the same speed for all participants (8 seconds per slide, again, 
typewriter fashion) to control the amount of time participants had to process the 
presented information. Although presented at the same speed, past research has 
shown that presenting the prior questions rapidly induces a sense of the mind 
working quickly and energetically on material immediately following, whereas 
presenting the prior questions slowly induces a sense of the mind working slowly 
and deliberately (Pronin & Wegner, 2006). 
The PowerPoint slide on which the ratio-bias paradigm was presented 
read at the top in large font “$$$ Real Money Decision $$$” to indicate to 
participants that the drawing would actually take place and that they could win 
$20 if a winning marble was drawn from their chosen urn. After the participant 
answered these two questions, the experimenter pulled out two urns – one 
containing 10 marbles, with 1 winner and 9 losers, and the other containing 100 
33 
 
marbles, with 9 winners 91 losers– and randomly drew a marble from the 
participants’ chosen urn. If a winning marble was drawn, the participant was paid 
an additional $20 for participating. If a losing marble was drawn, they received 
only their compensation for participating in the study ($5 or academic credit). 
Participants were then debriefed, thanked, and dismissed. 
Results 
 To assess the extent to which participants were inclined to follow the 
dictates of a rational analysis or side with a gut feeling, I performed a 2 (thought 
speed: fast or slow) × 2 (choice dilemma: apartment or ratio-bias) × 2 (choice 
order: urn choice first or apartment choice first) mixed-model analysis of 
variance with thought speed and order as between-subjects factors and choice 
dilemma as a within-subjects factor.  This analysis yielded only the predicted 
significant main effect of condition, F(1, 37)=5.83, p<.025, which reflects the fact 
that participants who had to process the lead-in material quickly were more 
likely to choose the intuitive option (22%)  than those who processed that 
material at a more leisurely pace (52%) (see Figure 2).  None of the other main 
effects or any of the interactions were significant, all Fs<1. Thus, participants’ 
fast or slow thought speed cued them to trust their intuitions or rational 
analyses, respectively. 
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Figure 2a. Urn choices in Study 2. 
 
Figure 2b. Apartment Choices in Study 2. 
Figure 2. Participants' responses to the urn and apartment choices in Study 2. 
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Study 3: Inside/Outside 
In Studies 1 and 2, I obtained consistent support for the state cuing 
hypothesis: Participants who were in mental states characterized by features 
typically associated with intuitive processing were more likely to opt for the 
intuitive option in an intuition-reason conflict, and participants in mental states 
characterized by features associated with rational processing were more likely to 
opt for the rational option. In Study 3, I examined the impact of a different 
association that people have to intuition and reason.  
Specifically, I was interested in the feeling that intuitions seem to come 
from somewhere inside of us whereas rational judgment seems to exist outside 
of the self. The rules governing rational judgement, unlike intuitions, are learned 
from others, derived from explicit pre-existing principles, and often executed 
externally—as on a blackboard, a pad of paper, a calculator, or a computer. 
Because of these intuition-internal and reason-external associations, the state 
cuing hypothesis predicts that anything that makes a decision feel as though it is 
happening “in close” to the body should encourage intuitive responses and 
anything that makes a decision feels as though it is happening “at a distance” 
should encourage rational responses. I therefore manipulated the perceived 
distance of the decision by placing the two response alternatives on separate 
clipboards and having participants either hold the clipboards in their hands while 
they made a decision or observe the clipboards at a distance while they made 
their choice. 
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Method 
Sixty-six Cornell undergraduates took part in the study in exchange for 
academic credit. Participants arrived individually and were seated at the end of a 
desk. To manipulate whether participants felt as though the decision was 
happening “inside” or “outside,” I put the decision-relevant materials on two 
clipboards. One of the clipboards had a piece of paper attached to it that read, in 
72-size Calibri font, “Apartment A: Favored by Gut Feeling.” The other had a 
piece of paper attached to it that read, in the same font, “Apartment B: Favored 
by Rational Analysis.” Participants assigned to the inside condition were asked to 
hold the clipboards, one in each hand. Participants assigned to the outside 
decision saw the same clipboards as those assigned to the inside condition but, 
rather than considering the options while holding the clipboards in their hands, 
the clipboards were instead propped upright at other side of the desk, 4 feet 
away. (The left-right positioning of the two clipboards was counterbalanced.) 
As soon as the participant was seated, the experimenter, who was 
unaware of the hypothesis of the study, either placed the clipboards in the 
participants’ hands (in the inside condition) or propped them up at the end of 
the desk (in the outside condition).  He then told the participant: “We’d like you 
to imagine that you are looking for a new apartment and you have found two (A 
and B) that pique your interest—and that you are now having trouble deciding 
between them. Over the course of making your decision, you’ve noticed that on 
some attributes, Apartment A appears to be a better choice than Apartment B.  
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On others, Apartment B appears to be the superior choice. In the end, you are 
torn: your ‘gut’ is telling you to pick Apartment A, but when you reason 
everything out, comparing the two apartments on each attribute and weighing 
the relative importance of each attribute, your ‘head’ is telling you to pick 
Apartment B.” He gestured to each of the clipboards as he described the 
scenario. Participants indicated their choice to the experimenter orally. The 
experimenter then took the clipboards and debriefed, thanked, and dismissed 
the participant. 
Results 
 Fifty-nine percent of participants in the inside condition chose the 
apartment said to be favoured by intuition, whereas only 31% of participants in 
the outside condition did so, X²=5.06, p<.05.1 
General Discussion 
Intuitive judgment has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention in 
recent years, resulting in many new and unexpected insights into the nature of 
snap judgments, the automatic components of judgment and choice, and why 
people are likely to second-guess what seems like the best choice from a rational 
                                                          
1
 There was also an unpredicted interaction between the order of the alternatives and the 
inside/outside manipulation, X²=12.00, p<.001.  Breaking down this interaction, the hypothesis 
was strongly supported when the intuitive choice was presented on the left:  Fifty-seven percent 
of participants in the inside condition chose the apartment said to be favored by intuition, 
whereas only 7% of participants in the outside condition did so.  However, when intuitive choices 
were presented on the right, this difference was substantially reduced:  62% chose the apartment 
favored by intuition in the inside condition, whereas 53% did so in the outside condition.  
Although highly speculative, this may have been driven by an odd feature of the situation in 
which intuitions were presented on the right, which was that participants were required to read 
from right to left, seeing choice “B” presented as the choice on the left, serving to make 
participants feel as though something was “amiss.” 
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perspective. Despite these recent insights into the nature and the power of 
intuitive judgment, however, we still know very little about how people figure 
out what to do when faced with a situation in which reason tells them one thing 
and intuition another. In this chapter, I sought to address this gap by examining 
one factor that may have an especially powerful influence on how people resolve 
such conflicts: the extent to which their internal mental state at the time of a 
decision resembles the features commonly associated with intuitive or rational 
thought—a phenomenon I have called state cuing. 
Across three studies, I found that people seem to be cued by their current 
mental state to favour intuition or reason. When people are in mental states 
associated with deliberative processing—such as when they find it subjectively 
difficult to process information about a decision (Study 1)—they tend to trust the 
dictates of the pertinent rational analysis.  Similarly, when people feel as though 
their mind is racing (Study 2) or that a decision is occurring “up close” rather 
than “at a distance” (Study 3), they are cued to “go with their gut” and to side 
with their intuitions.  
The key feature in each case is that the mindset that people experience at 
the time of rendering a decision is one that closely matches the features of 
intuitive or rational thought. Because intuition is rapid and efficient, mindsets 
that induce rapid thought serve to encourage intuitive processing and thus make 
intuitive choices more compelling. Similarly, because reason is slow, deliberate, 
and effortful, a sense of subjective difficulty in processing information relevant 
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to a decision prompts a more rational orientation and makes rational choices 
more compelling. Across the three studies reported here, participants were 
induced to favour intuition or reason in both hypothetical decisions in which an 
intuition-reason conflict was made explicit (i.e., imagining a situation in which 
one is torn between two alternatives for an apartment rental; Studies 1, 2, and 3) 
and in real decisions with monetary consequences (i.e., the ratio-bias paradigm; 
Studies 1 and 2). 
It is important to note that participants in my studies who favoured the 
reasoned analysis did not do so because they thought harder about the decision 
at hand and therefore were more likely to arrive at the normatively correct 
choice. In Studies 1 and 2, the rationally-optimal choice in the ratio-bias 
paradigm was obvious to all participants in all conditions because both urns were 
labeled with the chances of drawing a winner, facilitating an easy comparison 
between the two options. Furthermore, participants who were asked to choose 
between two hypothetical apartments did so in a context in which the intuition-
reason conflict was made explicit and no deliberation was necessary to compute 
which option was favoured by reasoned analysis. I therefore believe that the 
most parsimonious explanation for the results across the studies is that the 
similarity between participants’ internal states and the characteristics associated 
with reason led these participants to place more trust in the dictates of their 
rational analysis. 
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This raises a useful point of comparison with past theoretical accounts of 
how decision makers select choice strategies. These accounts have typically 
focused on two factors: the motivation to exert cognitive effort and the ability to 
do so (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986). These factors surely play a large role in the selection of a decision 
strategy. However, the results reported here suggest that an exclusive focus on 
these two factors leaves out much of what affects people’s choice of decision 
strategies. In the present studies, it is not the case that participants who made 
their choices deliberatively did so because they were able and motivated to 
perform the effortful analyses required. Nor is it the case that those who chose 
intuitively did not know the rationally correct answer. Rather, participants were 
cued by their internal states to trust one of two already-available answers. 
This phenomenon is consistent with previous research on task cuing in 
which we explored the predictors of how people resolve intuition/reason 
conflicts (Inbar et al., 2011) and it is also consistent with preliminary 
investigations of the state cuing hypothesis (Inbar, 2008). Just as this earlier 
research shows that people look outward—to properties of the decision task—to 
help them make a decision, the current work indicates that they similarly look 
inward to features of their current mindset or internal state at the time of the 
decision and use it as a diagnostic cue about which source of input to trust. In 
general, it seems that people are cued by available features of the surrounding 
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context—features both internal and external—that resemble those of intuitive or 
rational judgment and use these cues to help them to decide what to do. 
These cuing processes may have implications for people’s satisfaction 
with their decisions and with their sense of themselves as decision makers. There 
are many occasions in which the outcome of a decision is not known until long 
after a choice is made. Was it right to choose Cornell over Princeton? Was it wise 
to pursue this field of study? Is she the one for me? In all of these cases, whether 
or not the decision was wise can only be known in the fullness of time. But does 
this mean that people put their evaluations of their decisions—or of themselves 
as decision makers—on hold?  It seems unlikely. Some decisions “feel right” and 
others invite second-guessing long before the outcome is known. It may be that 
the fit between one’s internal state and the decision to choose the rational or 
intuitive exerts considerable influence on the sense that the choice was 
appropriate. So too might the fit between features of the decision context and 
the decision to choose rationally or intuitively (Inbar, Cone, & Gilovich, 2010). 
Because people tend to choose options that fit their internal states or the 
features of the decision context, they might tend to be rather satisfied with their 
choices, which might in turn feed the well-documented tendency for people to 
be overly confident in their judgments and decisions (Dunning, Griffin, 
Milojkovic, & Ross, 1990; Griffin, Dunning & Ross, 1990; Vallone, Griffin, Lin, & 
Ross, 1990). Conversely, those who choose in a way that runs counter to these 
cues might be especially prone to post-decision regret and dissonance—and so it 
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might be that going with a rational or intuitive option that “fits” leads to less 
dissonance, and less dissonance reduction, than choosing a rational or intuitive 
option that doesn’t match one’s internal state or the most prominent features of 
the decision context. 
The current results may also have important implications for consumer 
choice.  At auctions, for example—situations in which the auctioneer often 
rattles off information at a quick pace, thus inducing a sense of quick thinking 
and mania—individuals often report being “caught up in the moment” and losing 
their sense of appropriate rational considerations when making purchasing 
decisions, leading to greater impulse spending.  Along the same lines, imagine 
online shoppers making their purchases either on a device on which decisions 
are made “up close” (say, an iPad or a mobile phone) or “at a distance” (say, on a 
desktop computer monitor or laptop that sits further away from the user).  Many 
retailers (such as Amazon and Audible) offer mobile applications (e.g., for 
iPhones or Android-powered devices) that are equivalent to those that run on 
standard computers.  Based on the results of Study 3, perhaps those who make 
their decisions using mobile applications are more inclined to trust their 
intuitions when deciding what to purchase than those who use versions of retail 
software that runs on devices for which the visual display is “at a distance.” 
We often face difficult decisions in which the right path to take is 
unclear. In such cases, decision makers will often grab onto any useful input that 
they can to help them to decide what to do. Intuition-reason conflicts, by their 
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very nature, make for especially difficult choices, and here too, decision makers 
tend to grab onto any useful cues that are available, including what is happening 
inside their minds and inside their bodies.  
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PART II:  Prescription • When Can  
Each Process Be Relied Upon? 
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CHAPTER III. On the reliability of intuitive impulses 
In Part I, I took an uncritical look at the way that people decide to trust 
the outputs of an implicit or explicit process in the context of intuitive judgment.  
However, in this descriptive analysis, I said very little about whether people are 
well-served by these meta-cognitive decisions to trust an intuition or not.  In Part 
II, I now turn my attention to a prescriptive analysis of when implicit and explicit 
processes can serve as reliable sources for adaptive, satisfying decisions. 
Of course, even though Part I was more focused on the predictors of 
people’s choice strategies, some prescriptive inferences are perhaps 
unavoidable.  After all, participants who ultimately came to trust their intuitions 
and chose the intuitively compelling urn in the ratio-bias paradigm did so at the 
expense of reducing their overall likelihood of leaving the experiment with 
additional compensation.  In this way, the very nature of the paradigm is such 
that intuitive judgment is necessarily inferior to the normative standard by which 
the decision is judged.  It is perhaps quite telling, then, that the cues I explored in 
the previous chapter still ultimately led individuals to favour their intuitions even 
in light of the rational standard. 
I. When Are Intuitions Beneficial? 
 The ratio-bias paradigm serves as an excellent place to begin an analysis 
of when intuitions may or may not serve as a useful source of input into a 
decision.  This decision dilemma is a quintessential example of what Hammond 
and colleagues (1987) referred to as an indirect comparison.  In these types of 
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theoretical analyses, individuals’ intuitive judgments about a problem are 
compared against a formal rational statistical or economic “rule” that serves as 
the standard for how the decision “should” be made.  Hammond and colleagues 
have made the observation that such comparisons lead to the construction of 
situations that, by their very nature, can ultimately only serve to demonstrate 
that intuitive judgment is inferior to the rational standard—as evidenced by 
people’s choices in the previous chapter—or equivalent to it, and never superior 
to it. 
 However, Hammond and colleagues have argued that such comparisons 
are not the appropriate metric by which to gauge the relative quality of intuitive 
judgment.  Rather, to truly see the value of each choice strategy, researchers 
must focus instead on direct comparisons.  In these types of comparisons, an 
individuals’ intuitive judgment is compared against that same individuals’ 
rational analyses of the problem, exactly as they occur in their actual decision-
making. 
 This may seem like a subtle distinction, but it is important for at least two 
reasons.  First, it emphasizes the disparities between reasoning “in the abstract” 
and reasoning as it actually occurs.  Decision-makers vary quite substantially in 
their understanding of what constitutes an appropriate analysis or rational rule 
to apply to a given situation, and they often make mistakes in their application of 
these rules, particularly as rational analyses become increasingly complex and 
cognitively demanding.  Second, the normative standard for a particular decision 
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often makes unreasonable assumptions about decision-makers’ time constraints, 
motivation, and likelihood of possessing all of the information that is necessary 
to perform the analysis.  Indeed, a number of researchers have proposed that 
the way that decision-makers ultimately decide—employing a number of “fast 
and frugal” heuristic shortcuts in their analyses—may be the optimal strategy 
when more reasonable assumptions about these kinds of constraints are made 
(e.g., Gigerenzer et al., 1999; see also Simon, 1955). 
 Through the lens of direct comparisons, researchers have, in recent years, 
begun to catalog a number of situations in which intuitions appear to gain an 
upper hand on rational analyses.  Essentially all of these demonstrations have, 
either directly or indirectly, relied upon one particular strength of intuitive 
processes relative to more deliberative ones:  their capacity.  While intuitive 
processes can, by virtue of their parallel and holistic nature, usefully draw upon 
an essentially limitless amount of past experience, conscious deliberative 
processes are, by comparison, exceedingly limited in their capacity. 
 One prominent line of work that has honed in on this distinction is the 
naturalistic decision-making (NSM) tradition of research on intuitive judgment 
(e.g., Klein, 1999, 2003).  Researchers in this tradition have proposed that one of 
the reasons why researchers focusing on heuristics and biases in judgment under 
uncertainty have found it relatively easy to construct experimental paradigms in 
which intuitions lead participants astray is that these demonstrations have 
focused exclusively on precisely the situations in which intuitions are likely to be 
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the least useful: that is, those in which intuitions cannot usefully benefit from 
past experience in a domain.  On this view, to see the true power of intuitions, 
researchers must point their attention to domains in which individuals possess 
an extensive amount of past experience—what some researchers have called 
domain-related knowledge (Dane & Pratt, 2007).  Indeed, when the intuitive 
judgments of experts in a particular domain are given greater consideration, 
intuitions appear to be substantially more beneficial, usefully taking advantage of 
environmental regularities (e.g., Brunswik, 1957; Simon & Chase, 1974; Hertwig, 
Hoffrage, & Martingnon, 1999; Klein, 1999, 2003). 
 Of course, if intuitions are to usefully benefit from past experience, then 
this past experience must be predictive and representative of future situations.  
Researchers in this tradition have thus sought to identify the quality of one’s past 
experiences in a particular domain as a primary determinant of the relative value 
of an intuitive judgment.  Hogarth (e.g., 2001, 2010), for example, has proposed 
that learning environments can be characterized as either kind or wicked.  A kind 
environment is one in which feedback about the quality of one’s intuitive 
judgments is both veridical and timely, thus allowing intuitions to become 
better-calibrated over time.  A wicked environment, by contrast, is one in which 
feedback is scarce, misleading, unrepresentative, or otherwise biased.  A 
quintessential example of a wicked environment, for example, is one in which 
one’s experiences are based on an unrepresentative sample of possible future 
experiences, as when a doctor’s patients with a particular set of symptoms 
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happen to always have a particular disease when, in fact, many other patients 
with the same set of symptoms happen to have other diseases. 
 Interestingly, other recent lines of work have suggested that intuitions 
can be relatively well-calibrated even in situations in which individuals receive no 
prior feedback about the quality of their gut-level reactions (e.g., Betsch et al., 
2001; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006).  The paradigms employed by 
these researchers still seek to highlight the relative quality of intuitive judgment 
in situations in which individuals are exposed to an extensive amount of 
information that exceeds conscious capacity.  However, these lines of work have 
posited that intuitive, associative processes can usefully capture some elements 
of past experience without intention or awareness and that these implicitly-
learned elements of past experience can then be usefully applied to later 
decisions.  For example, Betsch and colleagues (2001) have shown that when 
participants are incidentally exposed to an extensive amount of stock 
information running along a stock ticker on the bottom of a computer screen, 
individuals’ gut-level reactions towards the stocks appear to be extremely well-
calibrated to the stocks’ actual performance—that is, their total value across all 
of the pieces of information encountered. 
 Thus, many recent lines of work converge on the notion that intuitions 
can usefully exploit prior experience and associative learning, thus giving 
intuitions an upper hand on rational analyses in situations in which: (a) intuitions 
have extensive (representative) prior experience on which to rely, and/or (b) the 
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information necessary to make a good decision exceeds the relatively limited 
capacity of conscious processes.  However, there is a notable feature of these 
more recent lines of work.  Although these paradigms do indeed overload 
participants with extensive amounts of information about decision alternatives, 
they nonetheless generally only expose participants to information that is 
relevant and necessary for an upcoming decision (e.g., Betsch et al., 2001; 
Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). 
 This is perhaps an important artifact of these experimental designs 
because although intuitions may indeed usefully capture the breadth of one’s 
past experience under these circumstances, there are often situations in which 
one’s prior exposure is extraneous or invalid and must thus be discounted in 
order to make an adaptive decision.  An important theoretical question thus 
concerns the extent to which the associative processes on which intuitive 
judgment is thought to rely possess a necessary filter for these sources of 
extraneous or invalid information. 
Suppose, for example, that before participants were exposed to the 
extensive amount of stock information in Betsch and colleagues’ (2001) 
paradigm, they happened to hear a rumor about one of the stocks that they later 
learn is fallacious.  If the associative processes on which intuitions rely fail to 
properly discount such information, then intuitive judgments about the stocks 
will be systematically biased, even though all of the necessary, relevant 
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information needed for an accurate gut-level reaction was available to 
participants. 
Indeed, some prominent theories concerning implicit phenomena have 
posited that one notable feature of associative processes is that they lack 
precisely this kind of validity filter (see, e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 
2011), and can thus have important impacts on judgment and behaviour 
irrespective of the truth value of the information on which they are based.  Thus, 
even if intuitions can usefully capture the breadth of one’s past experience 
without feedback, the situations in which they can serve as a reliable source of 
information may be relatively more circumscribed than these recent 
demonstrations may suggest. 
The goal of the current studies was thus to explore the extent to which all 
of one’s past experience may be promiscuously captured by the associative 
processes on which intuitions are based, even in situations in which a subset of 
this information can be easily recognized (deliberatively) to be invalid or 
irrelevant—and, moreover, even when individuals have been exposed to all of 
the information that is necessary for an accurate, well-tuned intuitions. 
That is to say, this was the original goal of the studies.  However, to 
preview the findings, several attempts to replicate earlier research that had 
demonstrated that intuitions can implicitly capture elements of past experience 
without feedback came up short, making a proper test of the hypothesis 
impossible. 
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Study 4:  Stock Ticker I 
 To properly examine the hypothesis that intuitions may sometimes 
capture irrelevant or invalid past experience, one must first establish that 
intuitive judgment is well-calibrated under learning conditions in which all of 
one’s prior exposure is relevant, as in past research.  The goal of Study 4 was 
thus to replicate the finding that intuitions can lead individuals to adaptive gut-
level, spontaneous responses. 
To this end, participants were first exposed to an extensive amount of 
information about the performance of a number of different stocks (see Betsch 
et al., 2001).  While they saw this information and read it aloud, they were asked 
to pay attention to a series of print ads displayed on the top of the screen, which 
was meant to serve as a mild distraction during information acquisition.  
Unbeknownst to participants, the performance of the stocks to which they were 
incidentally exposed varied markedly.  After reciting all of the stock information, 
they were asked to provide their intuitive assessments of each stock, with the 
primary question of interest focusing on the calibration between participants’ 
intuitive assessments and actual performance. 
Method 
 Participants.  Twelve Cornell undergraduates participated in exchange for 
$3. 
 Stock ticker program.  Participants were told that the study focused on 
their ability to memorize a series of rapidly changing print ads while they were 
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distracted by other information.  To this end, they were told that while they were 
viewing colour images of print advertisements on the computer screen, a stock 
ticker would proceed along the bottom of the screen.  Their task was the recite 
aloud all of the information that appeared on the stock ticker while 
simultaneously concentrating on the ads (see Figure 3). 
 The stock names that appeared on the ticker were similar to those used 
in past research (e.g., Betsch et al., 2001).  On the basis of a short pre-test 
(n=70), I established that Cornell undergraduates had similar reactions to the 
stock names as previous (German) participants on two key dimensions: (a) 
perceived familiarity, and (b) intuitive judgments of the past performance of 
each of the stocks prior to any exposure. 
 The stock ticker information consisted of a total of 75 pieces of 
information—15 pieces for each of 5 stocks.  Stock values were chosen to meet 
two criteria.  First, the total value of each of the stocks—that is, the summation 
of all 15 pieces of information—was chosen so that they varied linearly in terms 
of their final performance (RONAT, 300; ELSKAR, 400; FAMO, 500; NARVIG, 600; 
PATEL, 700).  Second, the minimum and maximum values for each stock were 
equated (+10 and +55, respectively) in order to prevent a single piece of extreme 
information from exerting an undue influence on people’s affective reactions. 
 The print ads consisted of a total of 60 high resolution colour images that 
cycled every five seconds on the screen.  The stock ticker ran until the final stock 
value reached the left side of the screen, which took exactly five minutes.  The 
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order of both stock information and print ads was randomized for each 
participant. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Screenshot of the stock ticker program.  Colour print advertisements cycle every 5 
seconds on the top portion of the screen while the stock ticker moves horizontally along the 
bottom portion. 
 
 
 Assessing intuitions.  Following the stock ticker, participants completed 
an online questionnaire that assessed their feelings about each stock.  To 
encourage participants to use their intuitions rather than rational analysis (see 
Betsch et al., 2001, Study 3), they were told that the next part of the experiment 
focused on the way that people’s intuitions operated and that, as a result, some 
participants would be asked to respond to the subsequent questions intuitively 
without thinking while others would be asked to think very carefully about their 
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answers.  All participants were told that they had been assigned to the intuitive 
thinking condition, and should thus make their decisions spontaneously and as 
quickly as possible. 
 Next, participants saw each stock on a separate screen and were asked to 
report their feelings about it by clicking a location on a horizontal scroll bar that 
had anchors of -5 (very bad) and +5 (very good).  Stocks were presented in a 
random order for each participant.  Finally, participants were asked to provide 
demographic information and were then debriefed, thanked and dismissed. 
Results 
 Table 1 summarizes participants’ intuitive judgments about each of the 
five stocks as a function of actual performance.  To discern whether participants’ 
intuitions about each stock differed, I performed a one-way repeated-measured 
analysis of variance.  This analysis revealed a significant main effect, 
F(4,8)=8.314, p<.01, suggesting that participants did indeed see distinctions 
among the stocks.  However, in contrast to previous research (Betsch et al., 
2001), these differences in participants’ gut feelings failed to capture the actual 
performance of the stocks in any meaningful sense.  By inspection, participants 
seemed to favour the lower-performing stocks relative to the higher-performing 
one, suggesting that they had very little insight into true performance.  Indeed, in 
stark contrast to the perfect linear relationship between intuitions and actual 
performance observed by Betsch and colleagues (2001), the correlation between 
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participant’s intuitive judgments and the stocks’ actual performance was both 
quite modest and trending towards an inverse relationship, r=-.217. 
 
 
Table 1.  Intuitive judgments of stock performance as a function of actual performance. 
 Stock Name (Actual Performance) 
 
RONAT 
(300) 
ELSKAR 
(400) 
FAMO 
(500) 
NARWIG 
(600) 
PATEL 
(700) 
Intuitive judgment (M) .91 2.08 .50 .50 1.25 
Intuitive judgment (SD) 1.83 1.62 2.47 2.32 2.26 
 
 
Discussion 
 Thus, the current study failed to uncover any evidence that intuitive 
judgment could accurately summarize an abundance of numerical information 
encountered earlier in the experimental session.  However, there were perhaps a 
number of features of the study design that may have unwittingly: (a) differed 
from previous research, and (b) had a substantive impact on participants’ 
intuitions in ways that served to reduce their accuracy.  For example, one 
notable aspect of intuitive judgment that has been emphasized in a number of 
distinct lines of work is that it can be relatively easily contaminated by conscious 
deliberation, or “thinking too much” (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 
2006; Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990; Wilson & Schooler, 1991).  In this 
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study, it is perhaps not implausible that participants had some opportunity to 
consciously deliberate about the stock information in ways that could have 
contaminated an otherwise well-calibrated intuitive judgment.  Because the 
stock ticker proceeded at a rather measured pace, with each piece of stock 
information appearing on the screen for a total of 15 seconds, there may have 
been an opportunity for subjects to recite each piece of information, direct their 
attention to the print ad, and still have some time to consciously mull over the 
stock information.  Of course, subjects were told that their primary focus should 
be the ads, but this ultimately requires that participants carefully follow 
instructions—an assumption that may not be warranted (see Oppenheimer, 
Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). 
Another possibility is that there may have been undue “noise” in the 
stock information acquisition process, disrupting, in some way, the associative 
processes that are thought to underly the capturing of this extensive prior 
experience.  This could have occurred, for example, if any incidental sources of 
affect were unwittingly introduced while participants were encountering the 
stock information, thus swamping any effects of the stock values on participants’ 
intuitive impulses.  Because many theoretical models of intuitive judgment have 
proposed that affect is a crucial feature of intuition (see, e.g., Damasio, 1994; 
Dane & Pratt, 2007; Epstein, 2008; Hogarth, 2001; LeDoux, 1996; Zajonc, 1980), 
we might expect that participants’ judgments could have been led astray by 
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these incidental sources of affect (Hogarth, Portell, & Cuxart, 2007; Hogarth, 
Portell, Cuxart, & Kolev, 2010; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). 
A third possibility is that some theoretical models have posited that non-
conscious processes require some time to operate on information acquired 
during past learning in order to consolidate it and better organize it in memory 
(Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006).  Because participants in this study 
made their judgments immediately after finishing the stock ticker paradigm, 
there may not have been enough of a delay for such non-conscious processes to 
operate. 
Finally, Betsch and colleagues (2001) have posited and provided evidence 
to suggest that participants’ judgments will not be especially well-calibrated if 
subjects do not provide a spontaneous, intuitive judgment.  One aspect of the 
original procedures that may have discouraged participants from doing so is that 
the precise numerical value of their responses on the dependent measures was 
prominently displayed to the left of the slider each time they clicked.  Because 
some of our previous work on task cuing (Inbar, Cone & Gilovich, 2010; see also 
Chapter 2) has indicated that participants are relatively more inclined to trust the 
dictates of their rational analyses when a choice feels precise or numerically 
evaluable, this precise numerical feedback may have ultimately discouraged 
participants from trusting their spontaneous judgments, encouraging them 
instead to rationally deliberate about each of their judgments. 
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Honing in on these four possibilities, a number of changes were made to 
the design in the next study that sought to: (a) reduce participants’ ability and 
motivation to consciously cogitate over the stock information, both during 
information acquisition and during the reporting of intuitive judgments, (b) 
reduce any potential extraneous influences that may have disrupted the 
acquisition of the stock information, and (c) introduce a delay between 
information acquisition and reporting of intuitions. 
Study 5:  Stock Ticker II 
Method  
Participants.  Twenty-four Cornell undergraduates participated in 
exchange for $3. 
Procedure.  Study 5 followed the same protocol as Study 4, except for the 
following changes.  First, the speed of the stock ticker was increased by 20% as a 
means of reducing participants’ ability to consciously deliberate on the stock 
information.  This meant that participants were exposed to the 75 pieces of 
information about the stocks over four minutes rather than five.2  Second, 
several of the advertisements that were judged to be potentially arousal- or 
affect-inducing were removed, as a means of reducing potential affective “noise” 
during the information acquisition process.  This included, for example, an 
advertisement for a digital camera that featured a high resolution image of a 
                                                          
2
 It is also perhaps worth noting that this change necessitates another deviation from the 
procedures of the previous study.  That is, participants saw only a subset of the total number of 
ads—48 rather than 60—and each participant saw a different subset of the ads, depending on 
the randomized order determined by the computer. 
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large, aggressively-poised snake; an advertisement that prominently featured a 
bald eagle and an American flag designed to evoke feelings of patriotism; and 
several advertisements that were designed to be humorous.  These images were 
replaced with other, more affectively-neutral images so that there was still a 
total of 60 advertisements that cycled every 5 seconds.  Third, a number of 
demographic (filler) questions were included at the beginning of the online 
questionnaire as a means of introducing a delay between the completion of the 
stock ticker and participants’ reporting of their intuitions about each of the 
stocks.  These included questions about participants’ age, gender, major, and 
year in school.  After answering these questions, they provided their intuitive 
judgments about each stock using the same procedures as Study 4, except that 
the response format was modified so that no numerical information was 
provided to participants while they made their judgments.  Participants’ 
responses were still recorded on a -5 to +5 scale as in the previous study.  
However, numerical feedback was never displayed to participants. 
Results 
Table 2 summarizes participants’ intuitive judgments about each of the 
stocks as a function of actual performance.  Submitting these responses to a one-
way repeated-measures analysis of variance, participants in this version of the 
task failed to exhibit any significantly different gut-level reactions toward the 
stocks, F<1, indicating that they had no strong insights into the stocks’ true 
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values.  Indeed, the correlation between intuitive judgments and actual 
performance was, once again, especially modest, r=.36. 
 
 
Table 2.  Intuitive judgments of stock performance as a function of actual performance. 
 Stock Name (Actual Performance) 
 
RONAT 
(300) 
ELSKAR 
(400) 
FAMO 
(500) 
NARWIG 
(600) 
PATEL 
(700) 
Intuitive judgment (M) 0.52 1.19 0.20 1.16 1.04 
Intuitive judgment (SD) 1.99 2.14 1.82 2.33 1.77 
 
 
 
Discussion 
It appears, then, that several theoretically meaningful changes to the 
study design did not serve to make intuitive judgments well-calibrated.  
However, these results are encouraging in the sense that participants in Study 5 
would not be led astray by their intuitions as they would have been in Study 4.  
Whereas participants in study 4 had intuitively felt that the stocks with the 
lowest performance were subjectively the best, participants in Study 5 were 
merely indifferent to the stocks, exhibiting no strong inclinations towards any 
one of them.  Perhaps, then, the changes made between these two designs were 
meaningful, but were not enough to prevent the various sources of bias that 
were resulting in miscalibration.  The next study sought to test this hypothesis by 
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further reducing participants’ ability to consciously deliberate over the stock 
information, and instituting an even large delay between information acquisition 
and reporting of intuitive judgments. 
Study 6:  Stock Ticker III 
Method 
 Participants.  Twenty-eight Cornell undergraduates participated in 
exchange for $3. 
 Procedure.  The procedures for Study 6 were identical to Study 5, except 
for the following changes.  First, the speed of the stock ticker was further 
increased, such the total display time was 3 minutes, 20 seconds rather than 4 
minutes.  Second, to create a larger delay between the end of the stock ticker 
and the completion of the dependent measures, several additional questions 
were added to the filler questionnaire, including questions about participants’ 
history in participating in psychology experiments, the location of their home 
town, and how often they had visited their family this semester. 
Results 
 Table 3 summarizes participants’ intuitions about each of the five stocks 
as a function of each stock’s actual performance.  As can be seen in the table, 
participants once again had no accurate insight into stock performance, nor any 
strong affective reactions to any of the stocks relative to the others, as confirmed 
by a one-way repeated-measures analysis of variance, F<1.  Indeed, the 
correlation between intuitive judgments and actual performance was, once 
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again, especially modest, r=.22.  Thus, evidence for a well-calibrated intuitive 
judgment remained elusive under these experimental parameters. 
 
 
Table 3.  Intuitive judgments of stocks as a function of actual performance in Study 6. 
 Stock Name (Actual Performance) 
 
RONAT 
(300) 
ELSKAR 
(400) 
FAMO 
(500) 
NARWIG 
(600) 
PATEL 
(700) 
Intuitive judgment (M) 1.01 0.94 0.84 1.08 0.87 
Intuitive judgment (SD) 1.59 1.53 1.66 1.71 1.65 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 It appears, then, that participants’ intuitive judgments remained 
relatively miscalibrated in spite of attempts to reduce conscious deliberation and 
allow some time for non-conscious processes to operate on the information.  
There is, however, one additional possible explanation for the miscalibration of 
the previous three studies.  Betsch and colleagues (2001) have suggested that 
one additional reason for instituting a short delay between the acquisition of 
information and the reporting of intuitions about that information is because of 
the possibility of a recency effect.  On this view, intuitive judgments that are 
made immediately after acquiring the information are unduly influenced by the 
most recent pieces of information that were encountered about each decision 
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alternative and it is only with additional time that intuitions come to more 
closely reflect the breadth of one’s past experience.   
Of course, one reason to be skeptical of this possibility is that the length 
of the delay induced in each of the past experiments appeared to have relatively 
little influence on the quality of participants’ intuitive judgments.  If recency 
effects were indeed having an undue influence, it would be expected that longer 
delays should serve to improve the calibration between an intuitive judgment 
and actual performance.  However, in the interest of thoroughness, I conducted 
one final replication attempt in which I more carefully controlled the last piece of 
information about each stock that participants encountered. 
Study 7: Stock Ticker IV 
Method 
Participants.  Fifteen Cornell undergraduates participated in exchange for 
$3. 
Method.  The procedures for Study 7 were identical to Study 6, except 
that the five values that appeared at the end of the stock ticker were fixed 
(RONAT, +39; ELSKAR, +37; FAMO, +34; NARVIG +34; PATEL, +38).  These values 
were chosen so that they represented those closest to the median of the 
distribution for each stock.  The other 70 pieces of information were randomized 
as in the previous studies. 
Results 
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 Table 4 summarizes participants’ intuitions about each stock as a function 
of its actual performance.  As can be seen in the table, participants’ intuitions 
were somewhat better-calibrated under this protocol than in the previous 
studies.  However, they still nonetheless failed to show any strong intuitive pull 
towards any of the stocks, as evidenced by a non-significant one-way repeated 
measures analysis of variance, F<1.  The correlation between intuitive judgments 
and actual performance did show some evidence of improvement, r=.69.  
However, effects on par with the perfect correlation found in previous 
research—or, for that matter, marked differences in participants’ intuitive 
judgments towards the stocks—remained elusive. 
 
 
Table 4. Intuitive judgments of stocks as a function of actual performance in Study 7. 
 Stock Name (Actual Performance) 
 
RONAT 
(300) 
ELSKAR 
(400) 
FAMO 
(500) 
NARWIG 
(600) 
PATEL 
(700) 
Intuitive judgment (M) 0.58 0.51 0.41 1.58 1.14 
Intuitive judgment (SD) 2.07 1.85 1.54 1.82 0.98 
 
 
 
General Discussion 
 In a number of lines of work, researchers have posited that intuitive 
judgment can implicitly capture many elements of one’s prior experience with 
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decision objects, even when participants encounter an extensive amount of 
information and they receive no feedback about the quality of their gut-level 
reactions (Betsch et al., 2001; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006).  
However, a notable feature of these lines of work is that participants are only 
exposed to the information that is necessary for an accurate, well-calibrated 
judgment.  This raises the question of whether intuitions can remain relatively 
well-tuned even in the face of extraneous or invalid past experiences.  In this 
way, although intuitions can indeed perhaps accurately capture the breadth of 
one’s experience with a decision alternative, if the associative processes on 
which intuitions are thought to operate are overly promiscuous in the types of 
past experience that are captured, the situations in which intuitive judgment is 
beneficial and reliable may be relatively more circumscribed than current 
empirical demonstrations might suggest. 
 The current studies thus sought to examine the robustness of intuitive 
impulses to extraneous sources of information.  However, across four attempts 
to replicate previous findings in which participants were exposed to objects that 
differed in their normative value, intuitions were found to be rather unhelpful 
even when individuals were only exposed to information that was relevant for an 
upcoming judgment.  Indeed, in all four studies, participants exhibited very little 
insight into their previous experiences with stock information.  This occurred 
despite several attempts to manipulate the extent to which participants were 
able to consciously deliberate over the alternatives—a factor that has been 
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claimed to influence the quality of intuitive insights (Betsch et al., 2001; 
Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; Wilson & Schooler, 1991)—as well as 
eliminate extraneous noise in the information acquisition process.  Because a 
well-calibrated intuition remained elusive, the hypothesis that intuitions can be 
relatively flighty in their development was ultimately untestable. 
 If we take seriously the dramatic differences in the results I have reported 
here and those of past work employing very similar procedures, there are at least 
three potential interpretations.  First, intuitions may not adequately capture 
elements of past experience in the way that contemporary theories have 
claimed—at least the types of elements of past experience that are necessary for 
possessing a well-tuned intuition in the context of the stock ticker paradigm.  
This interpretation would imply that past results may have been the result of 
anomalies in the procedures or other statistical irregularities that gave rise to 
spurious conclusions.  We cannot know for certain if this interpretation is 
correct, but it is a possibility that must be taken seriously in light of the fact that 
there are only a handful of studies employing this paradigm, most of which were 
conducted in a single laboratory (but see Plessner et al., 2008, for a conceptual 
replication of this result using markedly different procedures). 
 However, a more interesting theoretical possibility is that intuitions are 
indeed well-calibrated in situations like the one that the stock ticker paradigm 
seeks to capture, but there were important differences between the procedures 
I employed in these studies and those of past research—factors that served to 
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make intuitions inaccurate in my studies and accurate in previous ones.  This is 
an interesting possibility because, if true, it has important implications for the 
assertions that motivated these replication attempts—that is, although intuitions 
are perhaps accurate under a certain, well-defined set of circumstances, this set 
of circumstances is considerably more circumscribed than one might expect. 
 From this perspective, there are at least two theoretically meaningful 
mechanisms that may have made intuitions quite accurate in one case and quite 
inaccurate in the other.  First, unknown differences in the procedures may have 
given participants in my studies a greater opportunity to engage in deliberative 
thought, which contaminated an otherwise well-calibrated intuitive judgment.  
Betsch and colleagues (2001), for example, have found that if participants are 
forced to wait as little as six seconds before making their judgments, their 
intuitions become considerably less well-tuned to actual stock performance.  
More generally, as discussed earlier, a number of lines of work have sought to 
place the blame of poorly calibrated intuitions squarely on the shoulders of 
conscious processes that disrupt the weightings at which one arrives non-
consciously (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; Wilson & Schooler, 
1991).  These studies highlight the notion that intuitive judgment is only valuable 
to the extent that it is unfettered by conscious deliberation.  Of course, doubt is 
cast on this interpretation by the fact that manipulations that one would expect 
should have had an influence on the extent of participants’ deliberation—that is, 
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the speed of the stock ticker—had very little influence on intuitive judgments 
across the replication attempts. 
 The other theoretically meaningful mechanism by which intuitive 
judgment could have been made less accurate is that procedural differences 
between these studies and past research had a direct influence on the quality of 
people’s intuitions—that is, some element of my implementation of stock ticker 
paradigm that prevented participants from properly acquiring or integrating the 
available information into an accurate summary evaluation.  The implication of 
this possibility is that while intuitions may produce normative, accurate 
judgments, they can be affected quite substantially by some seemingly trivial, 
subtle factors that differentiate the procedures that I employed from those of 
past research.  This is interesting in light of the fact that in both my procedures 
and those of past research, participants had complete access to all of the 
information that was necessary to make an accurate judgment.  Yet it appears 
that they had relatively little access to this information when it came time to 
provide a gut reaction in my studies, and relatively good access to it in previous 
work.  In any case, what seems clear from these replication attempts is that 
there is still a great deal of work needed to understand when intuitive judgments 
are accurate and well-tuned and when they are instead miscalibrated and biased. 
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CHAPTER IV. Changing your implicit mind:  On the rapid formation and revision 
of implicit attitudes 
 In the previous chapters, I focused my attention largely on the nature of 
intuitive judgment.  However, the notion that implicit processes can sometimes 
be a source of bias and error in guiding behaviour is an idea that pervades not 
just thinking about the relative value of intuition and reason but also theoretical 
models of many other phenomena.  For example, research on stereotyping and 
prejudice has, in recent decades, emphasized the notion that individuals can 
harbour knowledge and evaluative responses toward outgroup members that 
are highly overlearned and thus acquire features of automaticity (e.g., Fazio, 
2007).  These rapid, spontaneous responses can sometimes be strongly 
inconsistent with one’s deliberate assessments, yet because they are activated 
and sometimes applied relatively automatically, they can nonetheless exert a 
subtle but important, unintentional influence on behaviour.  This is thought to be 
especially true in situations in which individuals fail to possess the motivation or 
ability to override these implicit responses, thus leading to behaviours that are 
sometimes inconsistent with more deliberate, conscious assessments (see Fazio, 
2007; Hofmann, Gschwendner, Nosek & Schmidtt, 2005). 
 This is not to say, of course, that researchers have suggested that implicit 
responses are always maladaptive.  Indeed, theorists have long proposed that 
implicit processes are highly adaptive in that they serve an important offloading 
function, guiding behaviours without conscious intervention and thus freeing up 
conscious resources for other tasks (see, e.g., Wigley, 2007).  Thus, not unlike the 
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heuristics and biases program of research in judgment under uncertainty, implicit 
processes are generally thought to be adaptive and necessary, but they can 
nonetheless be an important source of unintentional and sometimes inescapable 
bias.  Indeed, many theories emphasize that a primary role of conscious, 
deliberative processes is to serve as a monitor of the product of implicit 
processes, overriding these quick-but-sometimes-flawed responses when they 
may lead to error (Fazio, 2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011; 
Kahneman, 2011; Wilson, Lindsey & Schooler, 2000). 
 Delving into theoretical conceptions of implicit and explicit processes in 
more detail, it becomes evident that the notion that implicit processes can be a 
source of error is predicated on a number of assumptions that have been made 
about their nature and operation. For example, theories of attitudes have drawn 
a sharp distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes, suggesting that they 
are governed by different processes and learning characteristics.  Because 
implicit attitudes are generally thought to be governed by slow-learning 
associative mechanisms, their ability to incorporate newly-learned information is 
thought to be rather limited.  Thus, one common and pervasive assumption 
about implicit attitudes that a number of prominent attitudes models share is 
that they are thought to be relatively insensitive to recent (but nonetheless 
relevant) learning and experience.   
 It is not difficult to see how such a slow-learning mechanism could 
ultimately be a source of bias and error in many situations.  Although a number 
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of researchers have emphasized the value in an organism possessing a learning 
system or process that captures one’s long-term experiences with an attitude 
object over time (e.g., Smith & DeCoster, 2000), there are many situations in 
which recent, relevant information should (normatively) be an important 
determinant of one’s behaviour (Wilson, Lindsey & Schooler, 2000).   
Suppose, for example, that one has just learned that one’s romantic 
partner has been having an affair with one’s best friend.  This recently-learned 
information should arguably play a strong role in one’s future attitudes and 
behaviours.  Yet, because implicit responses are thought to be relatively 
insensitive to such information, they can thus sometimes encourage behaviours 
that are inconsistent with more deliberative assessments (that is, those that 
more easily incorporate recent learning experiences)—as anyone who has ever 
“drunk-dialed” their ex-boyfriend or -girlfriend knows quite well.  A similar 
situation occurs when someone whom one likes and admires succumbs to a 
dramatic moral failing that tarnishes one’s view of him or her.  In each of these 
situations, this recent information should, perhaps, play a strong role if one is to 
engage in adaptive behaviour.  The implication, then, is that implicit responses, 
by virtue of remaining relatively insensitive to these kinds of recently-learned yet 
highly relevant experiences, may need to be overridden in favour of a more 
explicit, deliberate response in precisely these types of situations. 
 Yet, despite the pervasiveness of this assumption about the nature of 
implicit attitudes, there is ultimately very little research that has attempted to 
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examine it empirically.  In this chapter, my goal is thus to explore this assumption 
in more detail, asking whether implicit attitudes are indeed insensitive to new, 
relevant learning, and whether they must necessarily be a source of bias and 
error in people’s implicit evaluations of targets in situations in which recent 
experience is relevant and important. 
I. Gradual Development, Slow Change 
Taking a more detailed look at theoretical models of implicit attitudes, 
the traditional assumption that they are slow to develop and resistant to change 
once established (e.g., Bassili & Brown, 2005; Conrey & Smith, 2007; Rydell & 
McConnell, 2006; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Wilson, 
Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000; cf. Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011) is one that 
follows primarily from the commonly held perspective that their operation 
depends largely on associative processes.  Because these processes are assumed 
to operate largely via the incremental accrual of information that slowly 
strengthens associations in memory over time (e.g., McClelland & Rumelhart, 
1985; Smith & DeCoster, 2000), implicit attitudes are similarly thought to require 
extensive and consistent experience with stimuli to become established.  
Moreover, once an implicit response towards an attitude object has developed, a 
similar line of reasoning suggests that it is only through extensive exposure to 
countervailing information that this response can be revised or “undone”—a 
prediction that has gained some recent empirical support (Rydell & McConnell, 
2006; Rydell et al., 2007).  Indeed, this assumption explains why most published 
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attempts to change people’s implicit attitudes have largely relied on evaluative 
conditioning procedures that provide exactly this sort of consistent and extensive 
countervailing information over many dozens or hundreds of trials of learning 
(e.g., Olson & Fazio, 2001; Rydell & McConnell, 2006). 
But are these assumptions about the learning characteristics of implicit 
attitudes correct?  In the attitudes literature, there has been surprisingly little 
research investigating the developmental trajectories of newly formed implicit 
attitudes, and the current empirical landscape is decidedly mixed.  On the one 
hand, some work challenges contemporary theoretical assumptions by showing 
that implicit attitudes can form without extensive or repetitive experiences (for a 
review, see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).  Several studies have shown that 
people appear to be able to implicitly evaluate novel stimuli on the basis of very 
little information acquired only moments earlier (Ashburn-Nardo, Voils & 
Monteith, 2001; Castelli, Zogmaister, Smith, & Arcuri, 2004; Gregg, Seibt, & 
Banaji, 2006; Otten & Wentura, 1999).  For example, Ashburn-Nardo et al. (2001) 
found that participants exhibited an implicit preference toward an ingroup to 
which they have been assigned in a minimal group paradigm only a few minutes 
earlier.  Similarly, Gregg et al. (2006) found that when participants were asked to 
suppose that novel, fictional groups possessed good or bad traits, the 
participants immediately exhibited implicit positivity toward the good versus bad 
group. 
On the other hand, however, other research suggests that once an 
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implicit response has formed towards an attitude object, it becomes largely 
insensitive to revision thereafter, even if it was formed only moments earlier 
(Gawronski & Strack, 2004; Gregg et al., 2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Rydell 
et al., 2007; Wilson et al., 2000)—a result that is more aligned with traditional as 
well as recent theoretical conceptions (see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011, p. 
88).  In one of the few studies exploring the sensitivity of implicit attitudes under 
minimal conditions of re-learning (as opposed to extensive evaluative 
conditioning, as described above), Gregg et al. (2006) tested whether 
participants would be able to incorporate new, countervailing information about 
fictional groups into their recently-formed implicit attitudes toward those 
groups.  They found that implicit responses were largely insensitive to exposure 
to new information, appearing to be “easier done than undone.” 
Thus, empirical findings on the developmental trajectory of implicit 
attitudes are both scarce and decidedly mixed.  What can explain such an unclear 
empirical landscape, in light of such strong theoretical claims?  Most attitude 
theories characterize associative processing as (largely or only) involving 
semantic memory, which does appear to afford only slow, gradual associative 
learning.  However, there are other kinds of associative processing (Amodio & 
Ratner, 2010; Poldrack & Foerde, 2007; Squire & Zola, 1996) which can occur 
extremely rapidly, even within a single trial.  For example, instrumental, goal-
directed learning as well as Pavlovian conditioning in animal models develops 
rapidly (e.g., Hermer-Vazquez et al., 2005; Yin & Knowlton, 2006), including 
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during single trial episodes (e.g., see Cahill & McGaugh, 1990; Hilliard, Nguyen, & 
Domjan, 1997).  Similarly, animals and humans have been repeatedly shown to 
learn avoidance responses to an aversive stimulus after only a single encounter 
(e.g., LeDoux, 2000; Rutishauser, Mamelak, & Schuman, 2006).  Although there is 
relatively little evidence establishing the kinds of associative processing 
underlying implicit attitudes, some researchers have argued against the sole 
involvement of semantic memory (see Amodio & Devine, 2006).   
The view from cognitive psychology and neuroscience that multiple kinds 
of associative processes exist, coupled with the empirical evidence in many 
animal models for rapid learning, suggest that the notion that implicit attitudes 
may only be acquired through slow, gradual learning should be re-visited.  In 
light of this work, I would expect that there are situations in which implicit 
attitudes can develop quickly (as recent work has found), and may also change 
rather quickly in light of new information (which has not yet been shown).   
Why, then, has previous work failed to find evidence of such sensitivity to 
new information (e.g., Gregg et al., 2006; Rydell et al., 2006; Rydell et al., 2007)?  
It has been widely assumed for many decades throughout the memory and 
learning literatures that organisms are more responsive to learning about objects 
that are instrumental to their outcomes (e.g., “unconditioned stimuli” need to 
have baseline relevance for the learner).  Thus, previous work on this question, 
by virtue of using hypothetical groups which have no immediate or future 
consequences for participants, may not have been a sufficiently sensitive test of 
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rapid revision.  That is, although it may be relatively easy to form an attitude 
toward a novel object in an “evaluative vacuum,” when there is no strong pre-
existing information, the revision of one’s attitude in the face of new information 
may require that the stimulus have some minimal relevance to the person. 
In 6 experiments, I introduced participants to novel attitude objects that 
have been shown repeatedly in the social psychological literature to have 
instrumental value to most people, including members of one’s ingroup (in 
Studies 8, 9a, and 9b); a character in a video game that either helped or hindered 
participants’ performance (Studies 10 and 11); and a target individual who 
participants learned had been convicted of a serious crime (Study 12).  After the 
introduction of the novel attitude object, later in each experiment, I provided 
new, countervailing information, assessing implicit attitudes both before and 
after this information was provided.  My main objectives were to: (a) provide 
additional evidence for the rapid formation of implicit attitudes, and, more 
importantly, (b) provide an existence proof that people are able to revise newly-
formed implicit attitudes on the basis of minimal re-learning. 
Study 8:  Minimal Group I 
Method 
Overview.  Participants were randomly assigned to a novel ingroup using 
a minimal group paradigm and their implicit attitudes towards members of the 
ingroup and outgroup were assessed.  They were then led to believe that there 
had been a mistake in their feedback and that they actually belonged to the 
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other group.  Participants were asked to re-do the implicit attitudes measure 
while keeping their true assignment in mind, with changes in implicit responses 
from time 1 to time 2 assessed. 
Participants.  Eighty-three undergraduates participated in exchange for 
academic credit.  Three participants were excluded due to computer 
malfunctions; four were excluded because they failed to realize that the fake 
data file (described below) contained inconsistent information; and three were 
excluded because they made a large number of errors on the second IAT (>10%). 
This left a final sample of 73 participants. 
Procedure 
Introducing the novel stimulus.  To assign participants to a novel ingroup, 
I used a procedure developed by Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Monteith (2001).  
Participants were told that the computer would assess their artistic preferences 
by having them rate how much they liked a collection of 20 paintings painted by 
two different artists—Quan and Xanthie (see Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2001, Study 
3).  Afterwards, they received (randomly-assigned) false feedback that indicated 
that they had a strong preference for paintings created by the artist Xanthie 
(Quan) by a margin of 90.3% to 9.7%. 
Measuring implicit attitudes.  After ingroup assignment, participants’ 
implicit attitudes towards members of each group were assessed using an 
Implicit Association Test (IAT; see Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998).  
Participants were told that they would be categorizing a list of peoples’ names 
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on the basis of which of the two artists each person preferred.  The names were 
unfamiliar to participants3, but they were told that a simple heuristic could be 
used to determine which artist the target person preferred:  those names 
containing a q should be categorized as preferring Quan, whereas those 
containing an x should be categorized as preferring Xanthie.   
The IAT consisted of 7 blocks of 40 trials each.  Only data from the critical 
blocks (that is, blocks 3, 4, 6 and 7) were analyzed.  In 2 of the critical blocks, 
participants categorized the targets as either Quan or Unpleasant or Xanthie or 
Pleasant.  In the other 2 critical blocks, participants categorized targets as either 
Quan or Pleasant or Xanthie or Unpleasant.  (The order of these critical blocks 
was counterbalanced.  Order did not interact with any of the independent 
variables and is thus not discussed further.) 
Reversing the meaning of the novel stimulus.  After completing the IAT, 
the experimenter entered the cubicle and indicated that she “needed to check 
something.”  What happened next differed by condition.  In the switch condition, 
the file contained what looked like the participant’s data from the painting 
preferences task, including two lines at the bottom of the file that were the 
purported summation of their preferences across the 20 paintings (see Figure 4).  
However, this file was modified for each participant to have the opposite 
feedback from what participants originally received.  When the participant 
                                                          
3
 For this task, I used the same stimuli employed by Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Monteith (2001):  Q 
names: Qutar, Aloqu, Boqer, Moraq, Narqo, Quy, Qazi, Qesh, Linquos, Jaqer. X names: Bixten, 
Volx, Nardoxa, Xerdo, Xercerla, Maxson, Yexx, Xamieh, Xindau, Lixner. 
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noticed the error, the experimenter apologized, explained that the computer had 
done this a few times today, and asked if they would be willing to re-do the task 
so that their data could be salvaged. 
 
 
OVERALL TOTAL FOR QUAN:  9200  90.7% 
OVERALL TOTAL FOR XANTHIE:  1280  9.3% 
 
Figure 4.  The last two lines of participants' purported data file for a participant initially assigned 
to prefer Xanthie. 
 
 
 In the control condition, the file contained a series of headers where it 
appeared as though data should have been recorded.  However, the rest of the 
file was blank.  After noticing the data recording error, the experimenter 
apologized, explained that the computer had done this a few times today, and 
asked if participants would be willing to re-do the task so that their data could be 
salvaged.  This condition was included to assess the effects of completing the IAT 
a second time without a switch in group assignment. 
 After participants completed the IAT a second time, they were debriefed 
and thanked.  (No participants reported any suspicion in either condition.) 
Results 
To create a measure of implicit attitudes towards Quan and Xanthie, I 
calculated two D-scores for each participant (see Greenwald et al., 2003).  Each 
D-score represented the direction and magnitude of participants’ implicit 
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preference for one target group over the other either at time 1 or time 2.  The 
score is calculated based on the differences in participants’ reaction times in the 
critical blocks of the IAT.  In this case, positive D-scores reflect an implicit 
preference for Quan over Xanthie, whereas negative D-scores reflect the reverse. 
To assess the effects of the manipulations on participants’ implicit 
attitudes, I performed a 2 (initial ingroup assignment:  Quan or Xanthie) × 2 
(switch condition:  switch or control) × 2 (time: 1 or 2) mixed-model analysis of 
variance in which group assignment and switch condition were between-
participants factors, and time was a within-participants factor.  This analysis 
yielded the predicted 3-way interaction, F(1,65)=4.992, p<.05 (see Figure 5). 
To understand the nature of this interaction, I conducted follow-up 
simple effect analyses.  First, to assess whether participants’ quickly formed an 
implicit attitude towards people in their ingroup, I compared time 1 implicit 
attitudes for those initially assigned to Quan to those initially assigned to 
Xanthie.  This analysis yielded a significant main effect of group assignment at 
time 1, such that those who had been assigned to Quan showed a greater 
preference for Quan than those assigned to Xanthie, F(1,71)=18.195, p<.001. 
Next, to assess whether participants rapidly revised their implicit 
responses in light of the “mistake” in their feedback, I analyzed responses 
separately for those in the switch condition.  This analysis yielded the predicted 
2-way interaction between time and initial group assignment, F(1,30)=11.509, 
p<.01.  Breaking down this interaction further, I examined changes in 
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participants’ implicit preferences from time 1 to time 2, separately for those 
initially assigned to Quan and Xanthie.  This analysis revealed that those who 
were initially assigned to Quan exhibited a significant shift towards preferring 
Xanthie at time 2, t(19)=2.695, p<.05.  Similarly, participants in the Xanthie 
condition exhibited a significant shift towards preferring Quan at time 2, 
t(18)=2.273, p<.05.  In contrast, in an analysis of the 2-way interaction for those 
in the control condition, the only significant effect was an (unpredicted) main 
effect of time, F(1,35)=6.882, p<.05, such that attitudes became more neutral at 
time 2. 
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Figure 3a. Implicit Responses in Study 8 in the control condition.  Positive values reflect a 
preference for Quan relative to Xanthie whereas negative values reflect the reverse. 
 
Figure3b. Implicit Responses in Study 8 in the switch condition. 
Figure 5.  Implicit Responses (D-Scores) towards Quan/Xanthie in Study 8. 
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Discussion 
When participants were led to believe that their group assignment had 
been based on mistaken feedback, their implicit responses towards each of the 
groups exhibited significant changes that were consistent with this newly-
acquired information.  However, when participants were led to believe that their 
data had merely failed to record properly, their implicit responses exhibited 
similar changes independent of their initially assigned group, merely becoming 
more neutral over time.  These results provide preliminary evidence that 
participants’ implicit responses towards novel targets can indeed develop and 
change relatively rapidly, even on the basis of minimal information (cf. 
Gawronski & Strack, 2004; Gregg et al., 2006; Wilson et al., 2000).   
However, a prerequisite for such rapid revision may be that the novel 
stimulus has some relevance to people.  Indeed, one notable difference between 
the procedures I employed here and those of past research is that participants in 
past work were asked to consider hypothetical groups that were of little 
relevance to them and had no consequences for their future outcomes or 
behaviour.  In contrast, in the current studies, participants implicitly evaluated an 
ingroup—and changes in such a group assignment were thus of considerably 
greater consequence to them (Campbell & Tesser, 1985; Tesser, 1988). 
One important caveat to this claim, however, is that participants in the 
control condition also exhibited an (unexpected) effect of time between the first 
and second assessment of their implicit attitudes.  Because of the nature of the 
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construction of the IAT—that is, because implicit responses are measured by 
having participants’ categorize items as part of one group or the other—the 
interpretation of this effect of time is somewhat ambiguous.  It could be that 
participants are exhibiting an inclination towards greater positivity towards 
Xanthie, an inclination towards greater negativity towards Quan, or some 
combination of these two possibilities. 
It is also important to note that the interpretation of participants’ time 2 
attitudes is similarly unclear.  Although participants exhibited a significant shift in 
their preferences from time 1 to time 2, they nonetheless failed to show any 
strong preference for one group over the other at time 2.  This result raises the 
possibility that participants’ time 2 attitudes may reflect “noise” or implicit 
ambivalence toward the groups (e.g., Petty, Tormala, Brinol, & Jarvis, 2006) 
rather than a clear shift in their preferences that cleanly reflects most recent 
learning.  However, given that participants in three of the four cells exhibited 
significant shifts towards a preference for Xanthie, the fact that participants in 
the switch condition who were initially assigned to Xanthie showed a significant 
shift towards preferring Quan is that much more impressive. 
Studies 9a and 9b:  Minimal Group II 
 Studies 9a and 9b were conceptual replications of Study 8.  However, in 
an attempt to address the shortcomings of Study 8, a number of changes were 
made to the procedures. First, the IAT was replaced with a different implicit 
measure—the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; see Payne et al., 2005).  
86 
 
This procedural change was introduced with the goal of ensuring that the 
completion of two consecutive implicit measures was relatively short, easy, and 
less tedious.  This change also necessitated a change in the way that ingroup and 
outgroup members were identified in the implicit measure (that is, the heuristic 
that participants used to distinguish members of each group)—these differences 
are outlined in more detail below. 
 Second, I used a different procedure to minimally assign participants to 
an ingroup, using a different arbitrary criterion for the assignment and different 
group names.  This procedural change was used to ensure that the results of the 
previous study were not an idiosyncratic feature of the group names or minimal 
group assignment procedure employed in the previous study. 
Method  
Overview.  As in Study 8, participants were randomly assigned to a novel 
ingroup using a minimal group paradigm and their implicit attitudes towards 
members of the ingroup and outgroup were assessed.  They were then led to 
believe that there had been a mistake in their feedback and that they actually 
belonged to the other group.  Participants were then asked to re-do the implicit 
attitudes measure while keeping their true assignment in mind. 
Participants. Experiment 9a: Ninety undergraduates participated in 
exchange for academic credit or $4.  Four participants were excluded due to 
computer errors, and 2 were excluded because the experimenter accidentally 
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provided the wrong false feedback in the “mistake” paradigm (described in more 
detail below). 
Experiment 9b: Fifty-nine undergraduates participated in exchange for 
academic credit or $4.  Two participants were excluded due to a lack of variance 
in their responses on the implicit measures (described in more detail below). 
Procedure 
 Introducing the novel stimulus. To assign participants to a novel ingroup, I 
used a procedure developed by DeSteno, Dasgupta, Bartlett, and Cadjric (2004).  
Participants were asked to make a series of estimations (e.g., “How many people 
ride the New York subway each day?”), and given (false) feedback about their 
likelihood of overestimating or underestimating quantities, resulting in their 
assignment to one of two groups.  In Study 9a, I used the same group names 
used by DeSteno et al.: Underestimators or Overestimators.  In Study 9b, I used 
the novel nonsense words Radmore and Markens.  For Study 9b, on the basis of 
two short pre-tests, I established that the group names Radmore and Markens 
were equivalent in terms of participants’: (a) explicit familiarity and liking of the 
group names, and (b) implicit evaluations of the group names prior to any 
exposure to them.  To help participants remember their group assignment, 
groups were assigned the colour green or blue (counterbalanced), and 
participants were asked to confirm the colour of their group on a short 
questionnaire. 
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Measuring implicit attitudes.  After ingroup assignment, participants’ 
implicit attitudes towards people belonging to each group were assessed using 
an Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; see Payne et al., 2005).   
Before the task began, participants were shown pictures of 6 ingroup 
members and 6 outgroup members.  The image of each face was tinged to reflect 
their group assignment (6 green, 6 blue) and the text of the group assignment 
was indicated below each face (e.g., “Underestimator”; “Radmore”) 
Next, participants completed the AMP.  Each trial consisted of:  (a) a 
prime (75 ms), (b) a Chinese pictograph (100 ms), and, (c) a backward mask 
(random noise), displayed until participants responded.  Participants’ task was to 
indicate whether they thought the pictograph was more or less pleasant than 
average.  Payne and colleagues (2005) have shown that people misattribute their 
automatic evaluation of the prime to the pictograph, providing an unobtrusive 
measure of people’s implicit attitudes toward the prime.   
 I used a total of 60 primes:  20 blue-tinged faces, 20 green-tinged faces, 
and 20 neutral images (grey-scale squares, pictures of office supplies, etc).  
Participants responded by pressing d or k on the keyboard.   
 Reversing the meaning of the novel stimulus.  After completing the AMP, 
the experimenter opened a file containing what looked like the participant’s 
data, including 4 lines that were the ostensible summation of their responses 
(see Figure 6).  However, this file was prepared for each participant so that it 
contained the opposite feedback from what they originally received.  Once the 
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participant noticed the error, the experimenter apologized, explained that the 
computer had done this a few times today, and asked if they would be willing to 
re-do the task so that their data could be salvaged (see Gregg et al., 2006).  After 
they agreed (all did so), they indicated their new group colour on a 
questionnaire, and completed the AMP a second time.  They were then 
debriefed and thanked.  (No participants reported any suspicion of the 
manipulation.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The last four lines of participants’ purported data file, in this case for those initially given 
feedback that they were an Underestimator (in Study 9a). 
 
 
Results  
To create a measure of participants’ implicit preference for each of the 
group targets, I calculated the proportion of times participants indicated that the 
target pictograph was more pleasant than average separately for each target 
group (Underestimators and Overestimators in Study 9a; Radmore and Markens 
in Study 9b).  Next, I calculated a difference score between the proportions of 
OVERALL TOTAL FOR ACTUAL: 7880 
OVERALL TOTAL FOR ESTIMATE: 9220 
   
-------------- 
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times participants chose more than pleasant for each of the groups.  This 
measure thus reflects an implicit preference for one of the groups relative to the 
other.4 
Because the studies were identical except for the names of the novel 
groups, I combined the data sets to increase power, and included the variable of 
Experiment in my analyses.5  I then performed a 2 (initial assignment: Novel 
Group 1 or 2) × 2 (ingroup color: green or blue) × 2 (time: 1 or 2) x 2 (Exp. 9a or 
9b) mixed-model analysis of variance.  (Note that, in this analysis, Experiment 
was not randomly assigned.)  This analysis yielded the predicted 2-way 
interaction between time and initial assignment, F(1,129)=8.394, p<.01 (see 
Figure 7), and this interaction was not qualified by any effects of Experiment (all 
ps > .49), indicating that the differences in the familiarity of the group names did 
not influence the pattern of results.6 
To understand the nature of this interaction, I conducted simple effects 
analyses.  First, to assess whether participants quickly formed an implicit 
preference for their ingroup, I compared participants’ responses at time 1 for 
                                                          
4
 For Experiment 9a, positive values reflect an implicit preference for Overestimators relative to 
Underestimators. For Experiment 9b, positive values reflect an implicit preference for Radmore 
relative to Markens. 
5
 Note that if Experiment moderated any effects, it would not be possible to determine whether 
this was driven by the different novelty of the group names because of a lack of random 
assignment.  However, these changes in the experimental design appear not to have had any 
substantive effect on the dependent measures. 
6
 To ensure that the effects in these studies were not the product of the way that the data from 
the two experiments were combined, I conducted the analysis in two ways.  In the first analysis, I 
assigned Novel Group 1 to Overestimator (in Study 9a) and Radmore (in Study 9b).  In the second 
analysis, I assigned Novel Group 1 to Overestimator (in Study 9a) and Markens (in Study 9b).  The 
results were equivalent between these two analyses, indicating that the results are not the 
product of the particular way that groups were assigned to Novel Group 1 or Novel Group 2. 
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those initially assigned to Novel Group 1 to those initially assigned to Novel 
Group 2.  This analysis revealed a stronger implicit preference for Novel Group 1 
when it represented participants’ ingroup than when it represented participants’ 
outgroup, F(1,135)=10.713, p<.001.  Next, to assess whether participants rapidly 
revised their implicit preferences in light of the “mistake” in their feedback, 
analyzed the effect of time separately depending on participants’ initial group 
assignment.  This analysis revealed significant shifts in participants’ implicit 
preferences when they were initially assigned to Novel Group 1, F(1,135)=2.913, 
p<.05 (one-tailed), as well as when they initially assigned to Group 2, 
F(1,135)=6.829, p<.01 (one-tailed).  However, there were no significant 
differences of participants’ responses at time 2, failing to uncover evidence of a 
full reversal, F<1. 
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Figure 7. Participants’ implicit preferences for novel group 1 over novel group 2 before (time 1) 
and after (time 2) learning of the “mistake” in their computer feedback. 
 
 
Discussion 
Conceptually replicating Study 8, participants once again exhibited 
significant shifts in their implicit preferences after learning of a “mistake” in the 
feedback they received about their group assignment.  This result provides 
additional evidence that is consistent with the assertion that implicit attitudes 
can change quite rapidly under certain conditions.  Like the previous study, one 
of the potential explanations for this rapid revision, I propose, is that the novel 
stimulus employed in the current study was of relevance to participants by virtue 
of its connection to the self (Campbell & Tesser, 1985; Tesser, 1988). 
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Although these results are entirely consistent with rapid revision, because 
attitudes theories make strong predictions about the developmental trajectories 
of implicit attitudes—not to mention some evidence already in the literature that 
is inconsistent with this result (Gawronski & Strack, 2004; Gregg et al., 2006; 
Wilson et al., 2000)—I sought, in the next study, to conceptually replicate the 
results of the previous two studies in an entirely different domain that would 
nonetheless still be relevant to participants:  a video game in which they 
interacted with objects that either helped or hindered their goal of achieving a 
high score. 
Study 10: Wugs I 
Overview 
 Participants were told that they would be playing two rounds of a video 
game in which they would be interacting with a novel stimulus. The meaning and 
relevance of the novel object shifted from one round of the game to the other. 
Whereas it was beneficial to the participant in one round (that is, afforded them 
points), it was harmful in the other round (that is, could steal all of their points 
and reset their score to zero).  Participants played one round of the game 
(counterbalanced), and then completed a measure of their implicit attitudes 
towards the object.  Next, they played the second round of the game and then 
completed a second measure of implicit attitudes. 
Method 
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Participants. Ninety-nine Cornell undergraduates participated in 
exchange for academic credit. 
Procedure 
Introducing the novel stimulus and changing its evaluative meaning.  
Participants played a short video game modeled after the classic game Pac-Man. 
In my modified version, players interacted with a novel object that replaced the 
traditional “ghosts” from Pac-Man.  I labeled this object a wug (Berko, 1958), 
depicted as a half-white-half-blue triangle with eyes (see Figure 8). 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  A wug. 
 
 
To examine any potential effects of the length of exposure to the attitude 
object, the amount of time that participants played the game was manipulated.  
In one condition, they played each round for thirty seconds before being stopped 
by the experimenter.  In the other condition, they never had an opportunity to 
play the game.  Instead, they merely read the instructions for how each round of 
the game would be played, with their implicit attitudes towards wugs assessed 
immediately after they read the instructions for each round.  This condition 
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allowed for an assessment of how participants’ implicit preferences responded 
to the expectation of an interaction with an attitude object cast in a positive or 
negative light. 
After playing each round of the game (or reading the instructions for how 
the round would be played), I assessed participants’ implicit attitudes towards 
wugs, assessing changes from time 1 to time 2. 
Positive Round.  In one round of the game, wugs were described as 
helpful.  Participants were told that if they could touch the wug with their 
character (a small purple square that replaced Pac-Man from the original game) 
they would earn points. 
Negative Round.  In the other round of the game, the wugs were 
described as harmful and participants were told to avoid them at all costs.  In this 
round, if the wugs touched the player’s character, they would be killed and 
would lose a life. 
 Assessing implicit attitudes.  Implicit attitudes were once again assessed 
using an AMP (Payne et al., 2005).  The specifications for this task were precisely 
the same as in the previous study, except that the primes consisted of:  (a) 20 
target images consisting of images of wugs as well as the word “wug”, and (b) 20 
neutral images, consisting of various coloured squares, pictures of office 
supplies, etc., as well as the novel word “dax.” Participants indicated their 
response by pressing either d or k on the keyboard. 
Results 
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 To assess whether participants’ implicit preferences were sensitive to 
their most recent experience with the attitude object, I performed a 2 (time: 1 or 
2) × 2 (initial description:  approach or avoid) × 2 (interaction time: thirty seconds 
or instructions only) mixed-model analysis of variance, in which time was a 
within-subjects variable, and initial description and interaction time were 
between-subjects variables.  This analysis yielded only one effect of interest: a 2-
way interaction between time and order that was unqualified by interaction 
time, F(1, 95)=20.056, p<.001 (see Figure 9). 
 To assess whether participants rapidly formed implicit responses toward 
wugs, I compared participants’ implicit attitudes at time 1.  This analysis revealed 
that participants who played (or read about) the positive round first exhibited 
significantly more implicit positivity towards wugs than those who played the 
negative round first, F(1, 95)=18.291, p<.001.  Moreover, there was also strong 
evidence that participants rapidly revised their implicit attitudes as the meaning 
of the wugs shifted from one round to the next, as evidenced by significant 
effects of time both for those who initially played or read about the approach 
round, F(1, 95)=9.843, p<.01, and for those who initially played or read about the 
avoid round, F(1, 95)=10.241, p<.01.  However, a comparison of implicit 
preferences at time 2 failed to reveal evidence of a complete reversal of 
participants’ attitudes, F(1,95)=1.107, ns.   
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Figure 9.  The two-way interaction between time and round in Study 11.  This effect was 
unmoderated by amount of exposure to wugs. 
 
 
Discussion 
In the context of a completely different domain and a different type of 
relevance, participants’ implicit preferences were once again found to shift very 
quickly, in line with one’s most recent experience with an attitude object.  
Moreover, participants even exhibited these strong shifts in their implicit 
preferences under conditions in which their exposure to the novel stimulus was 
exceedingly minimal.  Indeed, participants in the instructions only condition 
merely expected to interact with wugs at a later point in the experiment—
essentially abstractly supposing that wugs were either good or bad—without 
ever actually experiencing a positive or negative outcome as a result of 
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interacting with them.  Yet, this expectation appears to be enough for implicit 
responses to be responsive to recent learning and experience. 
Of course, one limitation of these previous studies is that they were 
conducted exclusively on Cornell undergraduates.  To ensure that the consistent 
effects observed across these studies were not idiosyncratic to the sample 
population I used in those studies, Study 11 was a conceptual replication of the 
instructions only condition of Study 10 that made use of an online sample that 
drew upon participants from all over the world. 
Study 11: Wugs II 
Participants 
One hundred and ninety-five participants on Mechanical Turk 
(http://www.mturk.com) completed an online experiment on “video game 
distractions.”  Twenty-four of these participants either: (a) had no variance in 
their answers to both AMPs (described below; 3 participants), or (b) made 
excessive errors (>10%) on one or both AMPs (21 participants), and were thus 
excluded from analyses. 
Procedure 
The procedures were identical to the previous experiment except for the 
following changes.  First, the entire experiment was administered via a website 
hosted on http://cornellpsych.org.  Second, having established that participants’ 
implicit preferences were equally sensitive to recent experience whether they 
interacted briefly with the object or merely expected to interact with the object 
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later in the experiment, only the instructions only condition was included in the 
design.  Finally, several changes were made to the instructions of the game to 
make the descriptions more concrete and engaging.   To give participants a 
helpful mnemonic for remembering the role of the wugs in each round of the 
game, they were told, in the positive context, that they should try to “hug a wug” 
by touching the wugs with their character.  If they could do so, the wug would 
give the participant’s character 500 points.  In the negative round, participants 
were told that the wugs should be avoided at all costs and that if the wugs could 
catch the player’s character, they would be “mugged by a wug” and they would 
lose all of their accumulated points. 
Results 
To assess whether participants’ implicit preferences were sensitive to 
recent experience, I once again performed a 2 (time: 1 or 2) × 2 (initial 
description:  approach or avoid) mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA).  This 
analysis yielded the predicted 2-way interaction, F(1, 169)=17.957, p<.001 (see 
Figure 10). 
To assess whether participants quickly formed an implicit preference 
towards wugs, I performed an analysis of participants’ implicit attitudes at time 
1.  This analysis revealed that participants in the positive description exhibited 
significantly more positivity toward wugs than those in the negative description, 
F(1,169)=9.606, p<.01.  To assess whether participants’ implicit preferences were 
quickly revised in light of recent experience, I assessed the effects of time 
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separately for each group of participants.  This analysis revealed significant shifts 
in participants’ responses from time 1 to time 2, both for participants who 
initially read the approach description, F(1,169)=7.775, p<.01, and for those who 
initially read the avoid description, F(1,169)=10.294, p<.01.  Moreover, an 
analysis of implicit attitudes at time 2 also revealed that participants who read 
the approach description showed marginally greater implicit positivity towards 
wugs than those who read the avoid description, F(1,169)=3.585, p=.06, 
indicating a full reversal of participants’ time 1 preferences. 
 
 
Figure 10. Participants’ proportion-pleasant judgments at time 1 and time 2 in Study 12. 
 
 
Discussion 
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 This study is thus entirely consistent with the results of the previous 
studies, suggesting that the earlier results were not the product of some 
idiosyncratic feature of the sample population on which they were conducted.   
This result thus strongly supports the contention that implicit attitudes can very 
quickly incorporate recent experience, at least in the context of these two 
paradigms. 
However, one obvious criticism of the previous 5 studies is that, by virtue 
of using novel attitude objects with which participants had had no previous 
exposure, the attitudes that participants revised in light of new information were 
based on very little information and had very little time to be rehearsed or to 
become crystallized.  Although using novel stimuli of this sort has the advantage 
of controlling participants’ previous exposure and history with the attitude 
objects, thus providing a cleaner test of attitude formation and change, one 
might argue that such a procedure creates precisely the type of implicit attitude 
that should be most malleable.  Indeed, although previous evidence suggests 
that even newly-formed attitudes (indeed, even those formed using similar 
procedures to those used in the previous studies) are insensitive to new, 
countervailing information (see Gregg et al., 2006, Studies 3 and 4), it remains an 
open question whether better-learned, more heavily-entrenched attitudes are 
similarly susceptible to rapid revision in the way that I have shown here.   
One reason to remain skeptical, perhaps, of the possibility of rapid 
revision of more well-established implicit attitudes is that previous research has 
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suggested that a great deal of counter-learning may be necessary to change an 
implicit response once it has become well-rehearsed.  Rydell and colleagues 
(2006, 2007), for example, showed that when participants were given extensive, 
consistent exposure to a target individual named Bob, participants formed an 
implicit attitude towards Bob that was consistent with their previous exposure.  
However, once these responses had been established, it took at least 40 trials of 
counter-learning before participants’ implicit responses appeared to exhibit any 
substantive changes, suggesting that they were relatively unresponsive to new 
information by virtue of having been heavily-entrenched in the earlier learning 
paradigm. 
However, it is still unclear whether heavily-entrenched implicit attitudes 
are always insensitive to new information, or if there are certain types of 
information that can cause rapid revision even after crystallization has taken 
place.  The counter-learning about the target individual in Rydell and colleagues’ 
studies, for example, involved mildly negative behaviours like parking illegally or 
missing an appointment with a friend.  Are there more dramatic types of 
revelations about an individual that can have a substantive impact on implicit 
attitudes?  That is, if participants learn information that is less like learning that 
an individual committed a minor infraction and more like learning that one’s 
spouse has been having an extra-marital for the previous several years, can it 
exert a greater influence on participants’ implicit responses?   
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This was the goal of the final study.  Participants first learned about a 
novel target named Bob, who was portrayed as universally positive over a 
lengthy learning paradigm.  Then, after assessing participants’ implicit attitudes 
towards Bob, they were given just one additional piece of information about 
him:  that he had recently been convicting of molesting children (see Castelli et 
al., 2004).  The primary question of interest was whether participants’ well-
rehearsed positivity towards Bob could be undone by this single piece of 
dramatic, extremely negative information. 
Study 12: Who is Bob, Really? 
Method 
Participants. Fifty-eight Cornell undergraduates participated in exchange 
for credit or $5.  Two participants were excluded due to a lack of variance in their 
responses on the AMP, and one participant was excluded due to excessive errors 
on both AMPs (>10%).  This left a final sample of 54 participants. 
Procedure.  Participants first completed a learning paradigm in which they 
read behavioral statements about a target individual named Bob (e.g., “Bob gave 
a hitchhiker a ride to a shelter”), identified by a picture presented directly above 
the behavioral statement.7 Their task was to assess whether they thought each 
target behavior was or was not characteristic of Bob.  After reading each 
behaviour, participants responded by pressing the c key (characteristic) or u key 
                                                          
7
 Following a similar protocol to Rydell and colleagues’ (2006) procedures, one of 6 different 
pictures of white males (judged to be of similar physical attractiveness in a pre-test) was used to 
represent Bob, randomly assigned for each participant.  Whenever a particular target served as 
Bob, the other 5 targets served as neutral stimuli in the implicit measure.  There were no effects 
of target picture in any of the analyses, and this manipulation is not discussed further. 
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(uncharacteristic).  They then received immediate feedback about their guess, 
which consisted of one word displayed in the center of the screen:  either the 
word “correct” printed in blue text, or “incorrect” printed in red text, followed 
below it by a summary of the meaning of the feedback (e.g., “Giving a hitchhiker 
a ride to a shelter is characteristic of Bob”).  To ensure that participants initially 
exhibited strong positivity towards Bob, 100% of the positive behavioral 
statements were said to be characteristic of Bob, while 100% of the negative 
statements were said to be uncharacteristic of him.  The order of the behavioral 
statements was randomly determined by the computer. 
Assessing implicit attitudes.  After the 100 learning trials, participants’ 
implicit attitudes towards Bob were assessed using an AMP.  In this case, the 
primes consisted of 30 pictures of Bob, as well as 30 pictures of 5 unfamiliar 
targets (that is, 6 pictures each). 
Changing impressions of Bob.  To assess the effects of new, countervailing 
information on participants’ now-well-rehearsed implicit reactions to Bob, 
participants were told that they would learn one new piece of information about 
him.  All participants were told that they should pay close attention because this 
new piece of information was more recent and could potentially differ from the 
impression they had otherwise formed of him.  In the experimental condition, 
participants read the statement, “Bob was recently convicted of molesting 
children.”  In the control condition, participants read the statement, “Bob 
recently bought a soda.”  In both cases, participants were reminded that this 
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piece of information was characteristic of Bob and that they would be tested for 
their memory of this statement later in the experiment. 
Participants then completed a second AMP, which followed the same 
protocol as the first.  They then completed a short questionnaire assessing their 
explicit attitudes towards Bob by judging his likeability from 1 (very unlikeable) 
to 9 (very likeable) as well as how bad—good, mean—pleasant, disagreeable—
agreeable, uncaring—caring, and cruel—kind they considered him to be, all on 9-
point likert scales. 
Results 
 To assess changes in participants’ implicit attitudes towards Bob, I 
performed a 2 (time: 1 or 2) × 2 (new information: child molester or control) 
mixed-model analysis of variance with time as a within-subjects factor and new 
information as a between-subjects factor.  This analysis yielded the predicted 2-
way interaction, F(1, 53)=10.327, p<.01 (see Figure 11). 
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Figure 11. Participants’ proportion-pleasant judgments towards Bob before (time 1) and after 
(time 2) learning either that he was convicted of molesting children (experimental) or that he 
bought a soda (control) in Study 12. 
 
 
 To assess whether participants had initially developed implicit positivity 
towards Bob, I performed a single-sample t-test on participants’ implicit 
responses at time 1, comparing them against the value .5, which represents a 
neutral implicit attitudes.  This analysis revealed a marginally significant 
difference in the positive direction, indicating that participants had indeed 
formed relatively positive implicit attitudes towards Bob after learning 
extensively about his many positive attributes, t(54)=1.959, p=.055. 
Next, to assess whether participants’ well-rehearsed implicit responses 
towards Bob were sensitive to the new information that they learned about him, 
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I examined the effects of time separately for participants in the control and 
experimental conditions.  This analysis revealed a significant shift in participants’ 
attitudes when they learned that Bob was convicted of child molestation, 
F(1,53)=10.096, p<.01, but no significant changes in implicit preferences when 
participants were exposed to neutral information at time 2, F(1,53)=1.914, ns.  
These differential shifts resulted in a significant difference between control and 
experimental participants’ attitudes at time 2, F(1,53)=17.894, p<.001.  
Moreover, when participants’ implicit attitudes at time 2 were compared, using a 
single-sample t-test, against the neutral value of .5, there was evidence that 
participants in the experimental condition had exhibited a full reversal in their 
responses, showing significant negativity towards Bob after learning of his 
conviction, t(27)=2.671, p<.05, whereas control participants retained their 
significant implicit positivity towards him, t(26)=3.282, p<.01. 
This result thus suggests that even a well-rehearsed implicit attitude can 
be sensitive to new information that is strongly inconsistent with previous 
experiences with an attitude object (cf. Rydell et al., 2006; Rydell et al., 2007).  
Indeed, even just a single piece of propositional information about Bob—that he 
had been convicted of a serious crime—was enough for participants to exhibit a 
complete reversal from all of the information that they had previously acquired 
about him in the previous 100 trials. 
General Discussion 
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Attitudes theorists have claimed that implicit attitudes are, by virtue of 
their reliance on slow-learning associative mechanisms, rather slow to develop, 
and rather insensitive to recent, relevant experiences with an attitude object 
once established.  Yet, in the 6 studies reported here, participants very quickly 
formed an implicit attitude towards a novel stimulus with minimal learning and 
experience—findings that are inconsistent with traditional assumptions about 
the learning characteristics of implicit attitudes (Bassili & Brown, 2005; Conrey & 
Smith, 2007; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & 
Deutsch, 2004; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000; cf. Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006, 2011), but that join emerging evidence of rapid formation (e.g., Ashburn-
Nardo et al., 2001; Castelli et al., 2004; Gregg et al, 2006). 
 More importantly, participants’ implicit attitudes were also found to be 
susceptible to quick revision in light of new, countervailing information (cf. 
Gawronski & Strack, 2004; Gregg et al., 2006; Wilson et al., 2000): in studies 8, 9a 
and 9b, participants’ implicit attitudes towards members of novel groups 
exhibited significant changes immediately after learning that their original group 
assignment feedback was the result of a computer error; in Studies 10 and 11, 
participants’ implicit attitudes towards a novel attitude object exhibited changes 
in line with manipulations of the meaning of the novel object; and in Study 12, 
participants’ implicit responses to a target individual were dramatically affected 
by a single piece of propositional learning.  To my knowledge, this constitutes the 
first evidence for rapid revision of implicit attitudes and challenges claims about 
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the nature of the processes underlying implicit attitude change, particularly 
theories predicting slow and gradual learning. 
Why did I find evidence for rapid revision where previous work did not?  I 
propose that an important difference between the present studies and earlier 
work is that the novel objects were simply made self-relevant and important to 
participants’ experiences in these experiments.  In Studies 8, 9a and 9b, 
participants were not exposed to hypothetical groups in vignettes, but rather to 
an ingroup—that is, one for which a change of ingroup assignment is more 
meaningful (e.g., Campbell & Tesser, 1985; Tesser, 1988).  Similarly, in Studies 10 
and 11, the manipulation of the meaning of the attitude object with which 
participants interacted was directly relevant to the goal of doing well in an 
upcoming task.  Finally, in Study 12, the piece of information that participants 
learned about the individual was particularly diagnostic of him, perhaps casting 
his previous behaviours in a different light, and evoking a sense of deceit and 
betrayal.  Of course, it is important to note that because I did not directly 
manipulate self-relevance in the current studies, I cannot be certain of this 
interpretation of the results, and additional research will be required to discern 
the conditions under which implicit attitudes are or are not sensitive to revision 
once established. 
These results are also inconsistent with previous studies that have 
employed similar learning paradigms to create well-rehearsed implicit responses 
(e.g., Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Rydell et al., 2007).  In this earlier work, 
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researchers found that implicit attitudes formed rather slowly and inexorably as 
additional information about the target was acquired, and changed equally 
slowly and only with extensive countervailing information.  Why did I find 
evidence of implicit attitude change after a single trial of propositional learning 
while in their studies they found that it took as much as 40 pieces of 
counterattitudal information to cause implicit attitudes to exhibit any 
substantive changes?  Although currently I can only speculate, there are a 
number of possibilities.  First, it is clear that not every piece of information that 
one learns about a target is equally diagnostic.  Learning that someone has an 
overdue parking ticket is substantively different from learning that an individual 
has molested children, and it is encouraging that the latter behaviour can be 
quickly incorporated into one’s implicit responses, even if the former cannot.  
Second, it may be the case that the nature of the information that was 
presented here is such that it is not only viewed as a single instance of 
exceedingly negative behaviour, but also as a behaviour that serves to cast all of 
the previous information about the target in a different light.  What was 
previously seen as an exceedingly charitable and generous individual suddenly 
becomes a self-serving, overly compensating criminal.  In this way, a single piece 
of propositional information served to undermine all of one’s previous learning 
about the target, which may have made it particularly effective in changing 
participants’ implicit responses. 
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Finally, being convicted of a serious crime carries with it a great deal of 
evaluative baggage—that is, a large amount of exceedingly negative evaluative 
information about the group “child molesters” that may be easily imported into 
people’s implicit responses towards a specific exemplar (Castelli et al., 2004).  
Indeed, one reason that the results of the minimal group studies may have been 
so effective in changing participants’ attitudes is by virtue of their association 
with the self—a construct that carries with it a large number of evaluative 
associations that can, perhaps, be readily generalized to objects that become 
associated with the self (see also, Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & Becker, 2007).  In 
the same way, attitudes towards Bob may have been quickly associated with the 
group “child molesters”, and individuals’ prior evaluative knowledge about this 
group could then be readily applied to him. 
Although teasing apart these explanations and the potential moderators 
of these effects will require additional research, these findings nonetheless 
provide an existence proof that implicit attitudes can possess learning and re-
learning characteristics that are inconsistent with those that are often thought to 
characterize implicit memory processes in the social cognition literature (see 
Amodio & Ratner, 2011).  Whereas models of implicit attitudes have generally 
assumed that associative processes afford only a single learning trajectory, 
cognitive and social psychologists and neuroscientists have argued that 
associative processes (sometimes called implicit memory) in fact consist of 
multiple, interacting systems and processes (e.g., Amodio & Ratner, 2011; 
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Poldrack & Foerde, 2007; Squire & Zola, 1996).  The current results thus suggest 
that implicit attitudes may rely on more than one type of associative or implicit 
process, and may thus exhibit different learning characteristics under different 
circumstances.  This view is also consistent with recent work showing that 
implicit measures (e.g., of attitudes) do not reveal a single process, but instead 
inevitably capture multiple processes (e.g., Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, 
Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005), some of which may allow for fast learning.  
 I have claimed that I consider this to be the first evidence of rapid revision 
of implicit attitudes.  However, one might suggest that there is ample evidence 
for rapid implicit attitude change already in the literature (e.g., Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011).  Indeed, research has shown that implicit attitudes 
towards the same stimulus are heavily context-dependent, responding to current 
emotional states, accessible goals, and a variety of other contextual cues (for a 
review, see Gawronski & Sritharan, 2010).  For example, Dasgupta and 
Greenwald (2001) reported that people showed reduced implicit negativity 
toward African-Americans when they had recently viewed photographs of liked 
(e.g., Michael Jordan) versus disliked (e.g., Mike Tyson) exemplars.  This does not 
necessarily indicate, however, that people’s implicit attitudes toward the group 
have changed in the way that I mean here (e.g., see Fazio, 2007; Ferguson & 
Fukukura, 2012).  Rather, such results may indicate the activation of different 
aspects of the same (unchanged) mental representation at the time of implicit 
evaluation.  And, most importantly, such context-specific implicit attitudes may 
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still require extensive experience and develop only gradually over time.  In this 
way, context dependence of implicit attitudes does not speak to how easily 
implicit attitudes can be revised in line with new information.  The current 
studies instead examined novel attitude objects with which participants cannot 
have had previous experience, and thus provide a more sensitive and controlled 
test of rapid formation and revision at the level of the mental representation. 
 The current studies highlight the possibility that implicit attitudes—even 
those based on a relatively large amount of experience—may have a greater 
capacity for change than current theories assume.  The implication, then, is that 
implicit attitudes need not be a source of bias in situations in which recent, 
relevant experiences should play an important role in people’s behaviour, at 
least under the circumstances captured in the studies reported here.  Indeed, 
theories predicting slow and gradual learning may very well be in need of (rapid) 
revision.   
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CHAPTER V: General Discussion 
I. 
What was the source of Timothy Cook’s intuition on that day in March of 
1998 that left him with the feeling that Steve Jobs had charted a course that 
would dramatically change the future of a failing company in disarray?  We will 
likely never know exactly what it was that gave rise that that stunningly prescient 
insight, nor will we likely ever know what it was that made his intuition seem so 
compelling that he chose to side with that feeling rather than all of the various 
logical considerations that had suggested it would be a mistake.  However, in the 
preceding chapters, I have tried to advance our understanding of situations like 
Cook’s, exploring the general principles that might govern how people come to 
trust one decision strategy over another and whether they are likely to be well-
served by doing so. 
In Chapter II, I sought to explore the descriptive question of how people 
can be influenced to trust the dictates of intuition or reason—that is, the 
predictors of trusting intuitions or ignoring them in favour of rational analyses.  I 
found consistent evidence to support the contention that one way people 
attempt to resolve such conflicts is by looking both outward—that is, to 
properties of the decision and the context in which it occurs—as well as 
inward—that is, to properties of their current internal mental or bodily state.  I 
found that when aspects of a person’s internal state closely resemble the 
features of intuitive or rational judgment, this can serve as a diagnostic cue that 
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leads them to trust one source of input over the other.  These studies that 
suggest that there are indeed systematic influences on the extent to which an 
intuitive judgment “feels right,” and that these influences can affect the choice 
strategy that people adopt in their decision-making. 
In Chapter III, I sought to turn my attention to the prescriptive question of 
whether intuitions can serve as a reliable guide for successful decisions.  In this 
chapter, I honed in on an assumption that has been made about the source of 
gut feelings, which is that they can implicitly capture the breadth of one’s prior 
experiences with an object, recording without awareness or intention many 
features such as frequency and value (e.g., Betsch et al., 2001; Betsch, 2008).  
However, such information is only useful, I argued, to the extent that the 
processes that govern the acquisition of information from the environment 
possess a necessary filter that can cast aside fallacious or irrelevant experience.    
Ultimately, this hypothesis turned out to be untestable due to consistent failures 
to replicate previous research using a well-known paradigm in the judgment 
literature, rendering this an open question for future research, perhaps 
employing other more reliable paradigms from the judgment and decision-
making literature. 
The purpose of Chapter IV was to extend the prescriptive analysis of 
implicit and explicit processes to the domain of implicit evaluation.  In this 
chapter, I honed in on another assumption about the nature of implicit processes 
which is that they are relatively insensitive to recent relevant experiences, thus 
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making them a source of bias in situations in which relevant experience should 
serve as an appropriate, normative guide for behaviour.  I found that there is 
reason to believe, however, that such an assumption may be unwarranted and 
that implicit attitudes can indeed come to rapidly reflect recent experience with 
an attitude object, particularly in situations in which the target is relevant to the 
individual and has important consequences for their future behaviour.  I found 
that when these minimal conditions of relevance were met, implicit attitudes 
shifted rather quickly and rather markedly in line with new, countervailing 
information.  Moreover, this occurred even for heavily-entrenched implicit 
attitudes that had been formed through extensive and consistent repetition over 
a lengthy learning paradigm.  This result thus suggests that implicit attitude need 
not necessarily serve as a source of bias when recent experiences are 
inconsistent with past learning. 
With these findings in mind, I now take a broader view of the results 
across these three lines of work, exploring some of their implications and some 
potential avenues for future research. 
II. When do implicit processes ignore irrelevant past experiences  
and when do they incorporate them? 
 
 There is a potential inconsistency in the theoretical arguments I made 
between Chapter III and Chapter IV.  In Chapter III, I proposed that theoretical 
conceptions of implicit processes might imply that intuitive judgment lacks the 
ability to filter unnecessary or irrelevant experience, and thus rather 
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promiscuously incorporates all aspects of one’s prior exposure with an attitude 
object irrespective of its truth value.  Cast in a different light, it might appear as 
though this claim implies that intuitions lack any mechanism by which to 
discount elements of past experience.  However, in Chapter IV, I argued that 
implicit attitudes can come to reflect one’s most recent experiences with an 
attitude object, suggesting that implicit attitudes can indeed discount past 
experiences in favour of only a subset of one’s prior exposure with the attitude 
object.  How are we to reconcile this apparent inconsistency? 
 As I argued, an essential ingredient in whether rapid learning and revision 
takes place seems to be the extent to which stimuli are relevant and important 
for future outcomes.  However, in stark contrast to the manipulations of 
relevance that I employed in the studies in Chapter IV, the paradigms on which 
the claim that intuitions can capture the breadth of one’s past experiences are 
generally designed in such a way as to ensure that the stimuli are relatively 
unimportant to participants.  Indeed, Betsch and colleagues (2001) have 
proposed that one of the requirements necessary for intuitions to reflect a 
summary evaluation of the value of a decision object is that individuals are mildly 
distracted during the information acquisition process.  Participants are told that 
their primary focus during the experiment should be on the print ads, and the 
stock information is described to them as merely a tool for distracting them 
while they attempt to memorize other information.  In this way, the stock 
information has very little relevance or importance, and these are precisely the 
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situations in which we would expect that intuitions fail to discount past 
experiences in favour of more recent, relevant ones. 
 I hasten to note, however, that it is still unclear whether intuitions 
promiscuously capture all of one’s past experiences by virtue of being unable to 
submit this claim to empirical test.  Moreover, even if intuitions had been shown 
to be influenced by fallacious or irrelevant information, it is still unclear as to 
whether such an effect would still occur even in a situation in which the stimuli 
were made more self-relevant—say, by indicating to participants that their 
compensation would be based on stock performance. 
III. The implicit:  One system/process or many? 
 
 In Chapter IV, I made the argument that implicit memory—the 
mechanism by which implicit evaluation is thought to operate—has been 
characterized by cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists not as a single, 
monolithic entity, but rather as several interacting memory systems that each 
possess different properties, learning characteristics, and developmental 
trajectories (Amodio & Ratner, 2010; Poldrack & Foerde, 2007; Squire & Zola, 
1996).  This is an important observation because it suggests that if theorists 
characterize the implicit system (or process) as a single entity, they may 
potentially gloss over important differences in the way implicit processes 
contribute to judgment and behaviour under different circumstances.  A number 
of researchers have proposed that we might profitably make further distinctions 
within the broad categories of implicit and explicit in order to capture distinct 
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abilities with different kinds of properties (Evans, 2008; Glockner & Witteman, 
2010; Gore & Sadler-Smith, 2011; Hogarth, 2010; Stanovich, 2004, 2011).  
Stanovich (2004, 2011), for example, has characterized System 1 not as a unique 
system with undifferentiated properties but as The Associative Set of Systems 
(TASS; emphasis added) to highlight the notion that it likely encompasses many 
different abilities that exert greater influence under different circumstances. 
 In the context of intuitive judgment, researchers have often lamented the 
lack of conceptual clarity regarding the study of intuition, failing to properly 
define what intuition is and what it is not (Betsch, 2008; Glockner & Witteman, 
2010; Hammond et al., 1987; see also Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008, for a similar 
concern about the related concept of “heuristic”).  More recently, researchers 
have sought resolve this lack of clarity by conceptualizing intuition not as a single 
type of judgment, but rather, not unlike contemporary conceptions of implicit 
memory, as a collection of interacting implicit processes that differentially 
operate in different types of judgments.  In a recent review, for example, Gore & 
Sadler-Smith (2011) sought to “unpack intuition,” proposing that it might be best 
characterized as several distinct types of domain-general mechanisms such as 
heuristic processing and associative learning, as well as several distinct types of 
outputs, including problem-solving intuitions (which are thought to form the 
basis of intuitive expertise), social intuitions, creative intuitions, and moral 
intuitions.  Glockner & Witteman (2010) have, in a somewhat different 
conception, proposed 4 separate sub-domains of intuition that may differ in 
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terms of their effects on a host of different variables (e.g., physiological arousal, 
decision time, etc.) 
 Although it is still unclear where the proper demarcations may lie, such 
distinctions may serve to resolve conceptual confusion about how intuition 
should be properly defined and when intuitive judgment is likely to be beneficial.  
Indeed, one potential resolution of the observation that researchers in different 
traditions (e.g., heuristics and biases vs. naturalistic decision-making) have come 
to quite different conclusions about the value of intuitive judgment is that these 
researchers may have unwittingly emphasized different types of intuiting—some 
of which are beneficial and others of which are more likely to be a source of bias 
(see Kahneman & Klein, 2009, for a more detailed discussion of the distinctions 
between these traditions and their possible synthesis). 
III. Do people have insight into when implicit processes are beneficial? 
 An interesting implication of the task and state cuing hypotheses 
(discussed in Chapter II) is that there is a great deal of variation in the extent to 
which people come to trust their intuitive judgments or not.  People appear to 
have lay theories about the relative quality of intuitive decision-making under 
different circumstances, trusting it in some circumstances and not in others.  An 
important theoretical question thus concerns whether people’s lay theories 
about when intuition is helpful align with the situations that have been identified 
by researchers as ones in which intuitive judgment is relatively more reliable.  
Are people’s intuitions about their intuitions correct?  Do they have any accurate 
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insight into when their intuitions are surer guides to sound decisions versus 
when they are more often a source of error? 
 As the failures to replicate in Chapter III highlight, we still know very little 
about when intuitive processes are beneficial or not.  Thus, the answers to such 
questions are still perhaps currently out of reach.  However, there are a few 
broad conclusions that warrant further exploration.  One important observation, 
for example, is that some of the factors that served to pull participants in the 
direction of their rational analyses are precisely the situations in which 
researchers have proposed that rational analyses are likely to be most 
unreliable—that is, in situations in which participants encounter difficulties in 
their decision-making, either because the problem is complex or the stimuli are 
difficult to process (Betsch et al., 2001; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 
2006).  If these researchers are correct in their assertion that intuitions have an 
edge on rational analyses in such situations, it suggests that people lack any 
meaningful insight into this phenomenon.  Indeed, Dijksterhuis (2004), in his 
discussion of his Unconscious Thought Theory, notably described the assertion 
that people are better-served by intuitions as problems complexity increases as a 
“somewhat counterintuitive idea” (p. 597), suggesting that it may defy many 
people’s intuitions about their intuitions.  
It is also worth noting that the manipulations of participants’ mental 
states at the time of their decisions that I reported in Chapter II were entirely 
incidental to the actual decision, and normatively should perhaps not have had 
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any strong influence on the choices that people made.  This suggests that 
participants’ lay theories of the power of intuition can indeed break down, at 
least under some well-controlled, experimentally-induced circumstances.  
Moreover, because of the nature of the paradigm used in those studies, any 
mindset that served to influence people to trust their intuitions simultaneously 
served to reduce their likelihood of receiving additional compensation, making it 
a normatively inferior choice strategy.  The fact that even in such situations 
people can still often be relatively more persuaded by their intuitive judgments 
than by a reasoned analysis is thus perhaps rather telling. 
 More generally, there is a strong theoretical precedent to suggest that 
individuals are largely ignorant of the experiences or processes that serve as the 
antecedents of their gut feelings.  Many researchers have proposed that a 
defining feature of intuitions is that their source (and, by extension, any biases 
that may exist in that source) is wholly unavailable to conscious introspection.  
Hogarth (2010) has proposed, for example, that individuals lack meta-cognitive 
insight into whether their intuitions have been honed in a kind or a wicked 
environment, thus leading them to place their trust in their intuitive judgments 
even when they are unreliable. 
 Nonetheless, there is still work to be done in determining whether people 
have any accurate insight into the quality of their intuitive decision-making—that 
is, work that examines whether the variance that is observed in people’s 
likelihood of trusting intuitions bears some resemblance to the likelihood of 
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intuition leading to good decisions.  Perhaps there are indeed reliable cues that 
exist in the environment that serve as an indicator to individuals that their 
intuition may be faulty.  If such cues exist, are people able to pick up on them, 
either consciously or non-consciously? 
To take an example, consider Hogarth’s central claim that the quality of 
intuitive decision-making is a product of the extent to which the environment in 
which one makes a decision is representative of the environment in which 
learning takes place.  One cue that may exist that could serve as an indicator of 
the quality of one’s intuitive insights, then, is if there have been any changes in 
the structure of the environment from the time of learning to the time of making 
a later decision based on an intuitive judgment.  Are people sensitive to such 
changes in the environment?  And could such changes serve as a cue to 
individuals that their intuitions may be relatively less useful and reliable?  
Suppose, for example, that participants are given relevant experience in one 
environment identifiable by a particular cue—say, a particular background 
colour.  Are participants more likely to side with their intuitions when making a 
later judgment if the same cues are present than they are if these cues differ?  
This is a question that awaits future research. 
IV. Future directions 
Implicit Attitudes 
In Chapter IV, I argued that implicit attitudes may reflect recently-learned 
information about an attitude object, even in situations in which one has had 
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extensive and consistent previous exposure with the object—a result that is 
inconsistent with traditional and contemporary theoretical conceptions (e.g., 
Bassili & Brown, 2005; Conrey & Smith, 2007; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000), and 
that runs counter to a number of findings already in the literature (Rydell & 
McConnell, 2006; Rydell et al., 2006; Rydell et al., 2007; McConnell et al., 2008).   
An additional assumption that has been made by attitudes theorists with 
respect to the learning characteristics of implicit attitudes is that they are 
especially responsive to affectively-laden associative information and especially 
insensitive to propositional knowledge.  McConnell and colleagues (2008), for 
example, have shown that implicit attitudes are, in the context of person 
perception, especially sensitive to affectively-laden group association cues, such 
as whether a person is obese or especially attractive.  They have suggested, 
moreover, that cues of this sort can swamp other aspects of one’s experience, 
even if that experience consists largely of instances of behaviour that are 
inconsistent with the affective cue.  For example, when participants learned 
about a target named Bob who was especially obese, McConnell and colleagues 
found that participants’ implicit attitudes were entirely driven by Bob’s obesity, 
and rather insensitive to whether Bob engaged in positive or negative 
behaviours.  An interesting question for future research, then, is whether the 
effects I observed in Study 12 are replicable in a context in which such affective 
information is salient.  Does learning that an especially attractive Bob has 
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recently molested children have a similar impact on one’s implicit responses 
towards him as it does when he is of average attractiveness?  Or is his high 
attractiveness enough to prevent rapid revision in such cases? 
Another theoretically meaningful question for future research concerns 
whether valence asymmetries may exist in the learning and re-learning of 
relevant evaluative information.  In Study 12, for example, participants were 
initially given positive information about Bob that was later reversed with a 
single instance of exceedingly negative propositional information about him.  
However, it remains an open question whether rapid revision can occur for 
similarly well-rehearsed negative implicit attitudes.  Although the studies that 
made use of the Wugs video game (Studies 10 and 11) failed to uncover any 
evidence of such asymmetries—that is, equivalent effects were observed for 
those whose initial experience was positive or negative—there is a strong 
theoretical precedent for such effects in affective learning.  Rozin & Royzman 
(2001) observe, for example, that an entire plate of pasta can be contaminated 
by a single cockroach, but that no amount of pasta can make a plate of 
cockroaches edible.  In the same way, perhaps, at the implicit level, no number 
of kind acts can make up for consistent moral failures. 
Another interesting question for future research concerns the 
generalizability of implicit attitudes to other novel targets.  Research has 
suggested that affective learning about one target can be generalized to other 
targets that bear a perceptual resemblance to it (Verosky & Todorov, 2010).  An 
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interesting question in light of the rapid revision observed across studies 8-12 is 
the extent to which the learning of new, countervailing information about a 
target can similarly generalize, at the implicit level, to other targets.   
For example, consider one’s implicit evaluations of one’s romantic 
partner.  What happens to these implicit evaluations when one learns that one’s 
partner has cheated on him or her?  The research reported here would suggest 
that such devastating information may have an immediate effect on people’s 
(presumably well-rehearsed) implicit responses towards their partner.  But what 
happens to one’s implicit evaluations of targets that resemble one’s partner?  Do 
such evaluations similarly shift in line with this recently-learned information?  
Even more interestingly, suppose that a novel target that resembles one’s 
partner has recently been convicted of molesting children.  Does learning this 
information have any substantive impact on one’s implicit responses to one’s 
partner, by virtue of the resemblance between the two? 
Intuitions about Intuitions 
 
 The focus of Chapter II was on the meta-cognitive task that individuals 
face when they are pulled in different directions by implicit and explicit 
processes.  In these studies, I focused exclusively on hypothetical 
intuition/reason conflicts in which the conflict was made explicit to participants, 
and other well-studied experimental paradigms that have sought to capture 
situations in which intuitive and rational processes pull in opposing directions. 
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However, as I outlined earlier in this chapter, researchers have 
increasingly begun to recognize that intuition may consist of many different 
types of implicit processes—including problem-solving intuition, social intuition, 
and moral intuition—that operate under different circumstances and possess 
different antecedents, properties and learning characteristics.  One of these sub-
domains concerns creative intuitions—the flashes of insight that people 
experience when they attempt to solve a creative problem or generate a new 
idea.  This is, of course, an area of long-standing interest to cognitive and social 
psychologists, and a great deal of progress has been made in understanding the 
antecedents of creative intuition.  However, like the analysis I performed in 
Chapter II, it is similarly true that considerably less is known about people’s 
intuitions about their creative intuitions—that is, the meta-cognitive problem 
that individuals face as they attempt to judge whether an idea that they have 
had is worthwhile and potentially fruitful, or flawed, trite, or otherwise 
uninspired. 
The analysis in Chapter II suggests that there may be interesting 
situational factors that could influence this meta-cognitive task, indicating, 
perhaps, that judgment of the value of creative ideas might be influenced by 
aspects of the type of task on which the creative ideas focus or on properties of 
an individual’s mental state at the time that an insight occurs.  Moreover, 
people’s intuitions about their creative intuitions may differ in important ways 
from their actual quality. 
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The Nature of Intuitions 
 In the same way that researchers in social cognition have made strong 
claims about the developmental trajectories of implicit attitudes, so too have 
researchers in judgment made strong claims about the speed with which 
intuitions develop (e.g., Plessner, Betsch, & Betsch, 2008).  A number of 
researchers operating within different theoretical frameworks have emphasized 
the slow-developing nature of intuitive impulses and their relative stability once 
they become established through extensive experience.  Simon (1987) famously 
contended, for example, that “intuition and judgment are merely experiences 
frozen into habits” (p. 63; emphasis added).  Betsch (2008), however, has 
probably made this assertion most explicitly, claiming that: 
“intuition primarily capitalizes on prior knowledge acquired via a slow learning system 
rather than on recently encountered information kept in short-term memory" 
(…) 
“herein lies one asset of deliberation:  It is open to new evidence enabling the individual 
to contextualize and to rapidly adapt to changing situations.  In contrast, intuition is 
more likely to produce convervatism in judgment and decisions because it is primarily 
driven by consolidated knowledge” (page 4) 
 
However, empirical tests of these claims are, to my knowledge, non-
existent.  This suggests that a fruitful avenue for future work may be to subject 
intuitive judgments to empirical tests similar to those employed in Chapter IV, 
Are intuitions relatively more susceptible to rapid shifts in a relatively short 
period of time than current theoretical conceptions assume?  Can they exhibit 
large reversals on the basis of relatively more recent learning rather than 
producing “conservatism” driven by “consolidated knowledge”? 
129 
 
 Relatedly, as I discussed in Chapter IV, social cognition researchers have, 
in recent years, begun to recognize that implicit attitudes are heavily influenced 
by the context in which they are activated, responding to current emotional 
states, accessible goals, currently activated mental representations, and a host of 
other factors (for a review, see Gawronski & Sritharan, 2010).  As I argued at the 
time, such results do not necessarily speak to the ability of implicit attitudes to 
change, but they do nonetheless speak quite strongly to the temporal 
(in)stability of implicit responses, suggesting that subtle changes in context can 
give rise to widely varying implicit evaluations.  Are intuitive judgments similarly 
susceptible to contextual influences?  Hogarth (2002) has suggested, for 
example, that intuitions may exhibit what he called “field” or “set” effects, in 
which intuitive judgments can be influenced by the state of an individual at the 
time that a stimulus is encountered.  However, taking a broader view, exactly 
what role does context play in the output of an intuitive process? 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
John Bargh and colleagues have characterized the shifts in social 
psychologists’ views over the last thirty years of the role of implicit and explicit 
processes in guiding behaviour as a “sea-change” (Bargh & Huang, 2009, p. 127).  
The phrase is quite apt.  We are at a point in the history of social psychology in 
which the role of non-conscious processes in guiding aspects of judgment and 
behaviour is taken more seriously than perhaps it ever has been.  Certainly, there 
are still many researchers that emphasize the virtues of clear, rational thought, 
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but the other side of the debate now has many more advocates than it had in 
previous decades. 
Like any complex issue, the truth is likely to lie somewhere in between 
these views and future research will be faced with the task of understanding 
when and why non-conscious processes are beneficial in how we decide and how 
we act.  In this dissertation, I have tried to make some progress on these issues 
by exploring the interaction between implicit and explicit processes both 
descriptively and prescriptively.  Although there is still a great deal of work to be 
done, I can only hope that the recent (relevant?) experience of considering the 
ideas I have laid out in this dissertation may contribute in some small way to a 
revision in one’s intuitions about intuitive judgment and implicit and explicit 
processes more generally.  
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